Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy / / Susanne Bobzien

• Autore: Bobzien Susanne
• Pubblicazione: Oxford, : Clarendon Press; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1998
• Descrizione fisica: xi, 441 p
• Disciplina: 188
• Soggetto topico: Stoics; Free will and determinism - History
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [413]-424) and indexes.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 DETERMINISM AND FATE -- 1.1 Physical and ontological foundations -- 1.1.1 The active principle -- 1.1.2 Causation -- 1.1.3 Motions and qualitative states -- 1.2 Teleological determinism defined -- 1.3 Causal determinism defined -- 1.3.1 The anti-Stoic argument for spontaneous motions -- 1.3.2 Chrysippus' reply -- 1.3.3 Causal determinism -- 1.4 Fate -- 1.4.1 Fate is God is Providence is Nature is the Active Principle . . . -- 1.4.2 The main aspects of fate -- 1.4.3 Teleological and mechanical aspects of Stoic determinism combined -- 1.4.4 The Fate Principle -- 2 TWO CHRYSIPPEAN ARGUMENTS FOR CAUSAL DETERMINISM -- 2.1 Causal determinism and the Principle of Bivalence -- 2.1.1 Chrysippus' Bivalence Argument -- 2.1.2 Chrysippus versus Epicurus on truth and fate -- 2.2 Causal determinism and prediction -- 2.2.1 Chrysippus' concept of divination -- 2.2.2 Chrysippus' proof of fate through the existence of divination -- 2.2.3 Causal determinism as necessary condition for the existence of divination -- 3 MODALITY, DETERMINISM, AND FREEDOM -- 3.1 Modal logic and the threat of determinism -- 3.1.1 Hellenistic modalities in general -- 3.1.2 Diodorus and necessitarianism -- 3.1.3 Philo and conceptual or essentialist modalities -- 3.1.4 Chrysippus' modal system -- 3.1.5 Contingency and freedom -- 3.1.6 Appendix: Identification of Chrysippus' modal notions -- 3.2 Objection: Stoic determinism and Stoic modal logic are incompatible -- 3.3 A Stoic reply: fate and epistemic modalities -- 3.4 Chrysippus' distinction between Necessity and that which is necessary -- 3.4.1 The textual evidence -- 3.4.2 Necessity and that which is necessary and their relation to fate -- 4 DIVINATION, MODALITY, AND UNIVERSAL REGULARITY -- 4.1 Objection: divination and Stoic contingency are incompatible. ; 4.1.1 The divinatory theorem -- 4.1.2 The second argument against the Stoics -- 4.1.3 The first argument against the Stoics -- 4.1.4 The relation between the two arguments -- 4.1.5 Chrysippus' modal notions conflict with divination -- 4.2 Chrysippus' reply: active causation versus regularity of occurrents -- 4.2.1 Negated conjunctions in lieu of conditionals -- 4.2.2 Divinatory theorems, sign-relations, and causation -- 4.2.3 A modification of the anti-Stoic objection -- 4.2.4 Divination, determinism, and human action -- 4.2.5 Appendix: Conditional predictions -- 5 FATE, ACTION, AND MOTIVATION: THE IDLE ARGUMENT -- 5.1 The Idle Argument -- 5.1.1 Exposition of the argument -- 5.1.2 The plausibility of the argument -- 5.1.3 Futility and goal-directed activity -- 5.1.4 Is the Idle Argument a sophism? -- 5.2 Replies to the Idle Argument: the sources -- 5.2.1 Cicero, On Fate 30 -- 5.2.2 Origen, Against Celsus II 20, 342.71-82 -- 5.2.3 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 6.8.25-38 -- 5.3 Chrysippus' refutation: fatalism versus causal determinism -- 5.3.1 Simply fated occurrents reconsidered -- 5.3.2 Co-fatedness and causation -- 5.3.3 Chrysippus' refutation and its implications for his determinism -- 5.3.4 Critique of Chrysippus' refutation -- 6 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHRYSIPPUS' COMPATIBILISM -- 6.1 Some preliminary considerations -- 6.1.1 Overview of the central passages -- 6.1.2 Chrysippus' conception of mind and action -- 6.2 Another argument against fate: fate renders moral appraisal unjust -- 6.2.1 The argument in Gellius -- 6.2.2 The argument in Cicero -- 6.3 Chrysippus' reply -- 6.3.1 Chrysippus' counter in Gellius -- 6.3.2 Chrysippus' formal refutation of the argument in Cicero -- 6.3.3 The cylinder and cone analogy -- 6.3.4 Another Chrysippean argument for moral responsibility. ; 6.3.5 Freedom, moral responsibility, and that which depends on us -- 6.3.6 Moral responsibility and the determination of character -- 6.3.7 The relation between antecedent causes, fate, and necessity -- 6.4 A later interpretation of Chrysippus' concept of fate? -- 6.4.1 The 'framework story' in Cicero's On Fate -- 6.4.2 Plutarch's dilemma -- 7 FREEDOM AND THAT WHICH DEPENDS ON US: EPICTETUS AND EARLY STOICS -- 7.1 Epictetus and that which depends on us -- 7.2 Freedom -- 7.2.1 The early Stoics on freedom -- 7.2.2 Epictetus on freedom -- 7.2.3 Is the only true freedom? -- 7.2.4 Freedom and that which depends on us in later antiquity -- 7.3 Cleanthes, Epictetus, the dog, and the cart -- 7.3.1 Cleanthes on Destiny -- 7.3.2 Epictetus on Cleanthes on Destiny -- 7.3.3 The dog and cart simile -- 8 A LATER STOIC THEORY OF COMPATIBILISM -- 8.1* Some notes on the sources and the origin of the theory -- 8.2 PHILOPATOR'S causal determinism -- 8.3 The role of fate in PHILOPATOR'S theory -- 8.4 PHILOPATOR'S conception of that which depends on us -- 8.5 PHILOPATOR'S compatibilism -- 8.6 The cylinder in later Stoic fate theory -- 8.7 The rise and fall of the problem of freedom to do otherwise and causal determinism -- Bibliography -- Index Locorum -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- G -- H -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- S -- T -- V -- Index Nominum -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- G -- H -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- S -- T -- X -- Z -- Subject Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- W.
• Sommario/riassunto: Susanne Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most important intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She reconstructs the theory and discusses how the Stoics (third century BC to second century AD) justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideasretain today.
• Titolo autorizzato: Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy
• ISBN: 9780191519314; 0191519316
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910812768003321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II