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Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : : A Model of Vote Buying / / Felix Vardy, John Morgan



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Autore: Vardy Felix Visualizza persona
Titolo: Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : : A Model of Vote Buying / / Felix Vardy, John Morgan Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (23 p.)
Soggetto topico: Corruption
Competition
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Associations
Bureaucracy
Clubs
Committees
Corporate crime
Crime
Criminology
Finance
Finance: General
Financial markets
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Public finance & taxation
Social Choice
Tax incentives
Taxation
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
White-collar crime
Soggetto geografico: United Kingdom
Altri autori: MorganJohn  
Note generali: "January 2006."
"IMF Institute."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Variation in Contracts""; ""A. Contracting on Votes""; ""B. Contracting on Outcomes""; ""C. Contracting on Votes and Vote Shares""; ""IV. Related Literature""; ""V. Conclusions""; ""References""
Sommario/riassunto: In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.
Titolo autorizzato: Corruption, Competition, and Contracts  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-1147-4
1-4527-3804-1
1-283-51666-7
9786613829115
1-4519-0807-5
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910811443603321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/011