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IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention : : An Analytical Framework / / Jun Kim



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Autore: Kim Jun Visualizza persona
Titolo: IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention : : An Analytical Framework / / Jun Kim Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (39 p.)
Soggetto topico: Economic assistance - Econometric models
Economic policy - Econometric models
Financial crises - Prevention - Econometric models
Exports and Imports
Finance: General
Financial Risk Management
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Portfolio Choice
Investment Decisions
International Investment
Long-term Capital Movements
Bankruptcy
Liquidation
Current Account Adjustment
Short-term Capital Movements
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Finance
International economics
Crisis prevention
Liquidity
Capital outflows
Solvency
Current account balance
Crisis management
Economics
Capital movements
Debt
Balance of payments
Note generali: "June 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. MODEL SOLUTION""; ""IV. COMPARATIVE STATICS""; ""V. KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: This paper presents an analytical framework for considering the role of IMF-supported programs in preventing crises, particularly capital account crises. The model builds upon the global games framework to establish a unique relationship between the crisis probability and the parameters of the program, which is assumed to be negotiated between the IMF and the member country, taking explicit account of each party's interests. In the model, from the perspective of the borrowing country, IMF financing and policy adjustment are (perfect) substitutes inasmuch as they both contribute to the country's liquidity and thus reduce the likelihood of a crisis. In equilibrium, however, IMF financing promotes stronger policies, implying that financing and adjustment are strong complements in crisis prevention. Conditionality plays a crucial role in sustaining the program, providing mutual assurances-to the member country that, if it undertakes the agreed policies, financing will indeed be forthcoming, and to the IMF that the country will implement the agreed policies as the IMF disburses its resources. The model helps explain how liquidity crises may come about, how IMF support can reduce the likelihood of a crisis by providing liquidity and sustaining stronger policies, and why the observed mix between financing and adjustment may vary across programs.
Titolo autorizzato: IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-8915-5
1-4527-0473-2
1-283-51765-5
9786613830104
1-4519-8312-3
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788404403321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/156