Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? / / Ashoka Mody, Stefania Fabrizio

• Autore: Mody Ashoka
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (53 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Budget - European Union countries - Econometric models; Fiscal policy - European Union countries - Econometric models; Elections - Economic aspects - European Union countries; Budgeting; Labor; Macroeconomics; Public Finance; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General; Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General; National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General; National Budget; Budget Systems; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General; Fiscal Policy; Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search; Budgeting & financial management; Public finance & taxation; Labour; income economics; Budget planning and preparation; Expenditure; Fiscal stance; Public debt; Unemployment rate; Public financial management (PFM); Fiscal policy; Budget; Expenditures, Public; Debts, Public; Unemployment
• Soggetto geografico: Poland, Republic of
• Altri autori: FabrizioStefania
• Note generali: "May 2006."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE: A SELECTIVE LITERATURE REVIEW""; ""III. BUDGET INSTITUTIONS IN NEW AND POTENTIAL EU MEMBER STATES""; ""IV. BENCHMARK RESULTS""; ""V. THE ROLE OF DEEPER DETERMINANTS: TIME-INVARIANT FACTORS""; ""VI. DIFFERENTIATING THE EFFECTS ON EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
• Sommario/riassunto: The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.
• Titolo autorizzato: Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline
• ISBN: 1-4623-9622-4; 1-4527-0575-5; 1-282-44793-9; 1-4519-8725-0; 9786613821133
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910788524103321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/123