Regulatory capture in banking / / prepared by Daniel C. Hardy

• Autore: Hardy Daniel C. L
• Pubblicazione: [Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept., c2006
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (25 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Banks and banking - State supervision; Financial institutions - State supervision
• Note generali: "January 2006."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-23).
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF BANKING REGULATION TO CAPTURE""; ""III. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION WITH MORAL HAZARD""; ""IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
• Sommario/riassunto: Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions.
• Titolo autorizzato: Regulatory capture in banking
• ISBN: 1-4623-4275-2; 1-4527-8143-5; 1-283-51665-9; 9786613829108; 1-4519-0830-X
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910816276203321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/34.