The Costs of Sovereign Default / / Eduardo Borensztein, Ugo Panizza

• Autore: Borensztein Eduardo
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (52 p.)
• Disciplina: 336.3435
• Soggetto topico: Debts, External - Econometric models; Default (Finance) - Econometric models; Debts, Public; Financial crises - Econometric models; Bank failures - Econometric models; Banks and Banking; Exports and Imports; Money and Monetary Policy; International Lending and Debt Problems; Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General; Financial Crises; International economics; Monetary economics; Economic & financial crises & disasters; Trade credits; Banking crises; Credit ratings; Bank credit; Debt default; Debts, External; Financial crises; Credit
• Soggetto geografico: Argentina
• Altri autori: PanizzaUgo
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. Two Hundred Years of Sovereign Default; III. Default and GDP Growth; IV. Default and Reputation; V. Default and International Trade; VI. Default and the Domestic Banking System; VII. Political Implications of Default; VIII. Conclusions; References; Figures; 1. Number of Defaults (1824-2004); Tables; 1. Default Episodes; 2. Default and Growth, Panel 1972-2000; 3. Default and Growth, Panel 1972-2000; 4. Default and Credit Ratings, Cross Section Regression, 1999-2002; 5. Defaults and Bond Spreads, Panel Regression, 1997-2004; 6. Default and Trade Credit ; 7. Default and Trade: Does Trade Credit Matter?8. Probabilities of Default and Banking Crisis; 9. Default and Industry Value-Added Growth; 10. Defaults and Elections; 11. Type of Default; 12. Type of Default and Government; Appendix Tables; A1. Private Lending to Sovereign. Default and Rescheduling; A2: Logit Model for the Probability of Default
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper evaluates empirically four types of cost that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels. The political consequences of a debt crisis, by contrast, seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers, broadly in line with what happens in currency crises.
• Titolo autorizzato: The Costs of Sovereign Default
• ISBN: 1-4623-3157-2; 1-4527-0165-2; 1-4518-7096-5; 1-282-84189-0; 9786612841897
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910788344403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/238