Economic regulation of urban and regional airports : incentives, efficiency and benchmarking / / Peter Forsyth [et al.], editors

• Pubblicazione: Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer Nature Switzerland AG, , [2023]; ©2023
• Edizione: First edition.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (453 pages)
• Disciplina: 387.71
• Soggetto topico: Airports - Finance; Airports - Economic aspects; Aeronautics, Commercial - Government policy
• Persona (resp. second.): ForsythP (Peter)
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Background -- 1.2 Part I: The Need for Economic Regulation -- 1.3 Part I: Systems of Regulation -- 1.4 Part II: Benchmarking -- 1.5 Part III: Regulation in Practice: Facts and Systems of Regulation -- References -- Part I: Theoretical Background: Market Power and Regulation -- Chapter 2: How Strong Is Airport Competition: Is There a Case for Regulation? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Competition and the Case for Regulation -- 2.2.1 Market Power and the Classic Case for Regulation -- 2.2.2 The Allocative Efficiency Argument -- 2.2.3 Regulation, Competition and Public Airports -- 2.2.4 Alternative Arguments for Regulation: Transaction Costs and Opportunistic Behaviour -- 2.2.5 Distribution, Regulation and Competition -- 2.3 Airport Competition: A Brief Overview -- 2.3.1 Privatization and Incentives for Profit -- 2.3.2 Types of Airports and Sources of Competition -- 2.4 Substitutability of Airports -- 2.4.1 Demand Side and Supply Side Substitution -- 2.4.2 Provision of Infrastructure for O& -- D and Transfer Passengers and for Cargo: The Definition of Catchment Areas -- 2.4.3 High-Speed Rail Competition -- 2.4.4 Bundling: Aviation-Related Services and Market Power -- 2.5 Countervailing Power -- 2.5.1 Are There Alternative Airports Available? -- 2.5.2 Are Airline Markets Competitive, Contestable or Concentrated? -- 2.5.3 Countervailing Power and Subsidies -- 2.5.4 Countervailing Power and Passenger Interests -- 2.5.5 Competition and Countervailing Power: A Summary -- 2.6 Some Evidence of the Use of Market Power -- 2.6.1 Airport Charging Behaviour -- 2.6.2 The Presence of Price Discrimination -- 2.7 Studies of Competition and Market Power: A Brief Review -- 2.7.1 Airport Competition in the UK Market -- 2.7.2 The Productivity Commission Inquiries -- 2.7.3 Assessing Market Power at Amsterdam Airport. ; 2.7.4 The Two ACI Studies by Copenhagen Economics Studies and OXERA -- 2.8 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: European Hub Airport Competition: An Assessment of Market Concentration in the Local Catchment and in the Transfer ... -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 European Hub Airport Market Development -- 3.3 Review of Hub Airport Competition -- 3.4 Competition in the Local Catchment -- 3.5 Competition in the Transfer Market -- 3.6 Discussion and Implications for Economic Regulation -- Appendix -- References -- Chapter 4: The Transactions Costs Foundation for Public Utility Regulation and Its Application to the Regulation of Airports -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy -- 4.2.1 Relationship-Specific Investment and Hold-Up -- 4.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy -- 4.2.2.1 Ownership Solutions to the Monopoly Problem -- 4.2.2.2 Contractual Solutions to the Monopoly Problem -- 4.2.3 Public Policies Towards Natural Monopoly -- 4.3 Transaction Cost Economics and Airport Regulation -- 4.3.1 Protecting Sunk-Specific Investment in the Air Transport Sector -- 4.3.1.1 Ownership Solutions to the Airport Monopoly Problem -- 4.3.1.2 Contractual Solutions to the Airport Monopoly Problem -- 4.3.2 Implications of the Transaction Cost Approach to Airport Regulation -- 4.4 Comments and Discussion -- 4.4.1 The Public Interest Is Broader than the Interests of Airports and Airlines -- 4.4.2 Airports and Airlines May Exercise Market Power in Other Ways -- 4.4.3 Why Do We Observe Arms-Length Regulation of a Government-Owned Facility? -- 4.4.4 Why Do We Not See Independent Dispute Resolution in Practice? -- 4.4.5 Potential Reform of Airport Regulation -- 4.5 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 5: Cost-Based Versus Incentive Regulation for Airports -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 ROR-Regulation. ; 5.2.1 Technical Illustration of the Averch-Johnson Effect -- 5.2.2 Rate-of-Return Regulation Gives Improper Incentive -- 5.3 Incentive Regulation -- 5.3.1 Price Cap Regulation -- 5.3.1.1 Cost-Minimizing Behavior and Rents -- 5.3.2 Other Forms of Regulation -- 5.4 Airport Regulation -- 5.4.1 Double Marginalization -- 5.4.2 Policy Competition -- 5.4.3 Slot-Controlled Airports -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: Airport Privatization and Regulation: Effects on Airport Charge, Capacity, and Social Welfare -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Basic Model -- 6.2.1 Consumers -- 6.2.2 Airlines -- 6.2.3 Non-Aeronautical Service Market -- 6.2.4 Airport´s Profit and Social Welfare -- 6.3 Welfare Maximization vs. Public Airport -- 6.4 Privatization of Aeronautical and Non-Aeronautical Services -- 6.4.1 No Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.4.2 Price-Cap Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.4.3 Cost-Based Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.5 Numerical Results -- 6.5.1 Welfare Maximization vs. Public Airport -- 6.5.2 Privatization -- 6.5.3 Price-Cap vs. Cost-Based Regulation -- 6.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to the Base Case -- 6.5.4.1 Smaller Cost Differences Between Public and Private Operations -- 6.5.4.2 Higher Time Cost -- 6.5.4.3 Higher Regulatory Waste -- 6.5.4.4 Higher Degrees of Airline Competition and Competition Among Non-Aeronautical Shops -- 6.5.4.5 Higher Internalization Rate of Profit from Non-Aeronautical Service -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix 1 -- Appendix 2 -- Appendix 3 -- Appendix 4 -- Appendix 5 -- Appendix 6 -- Appendix 7 -- Appendix 8 -- Appendix 9 -- References -- Chapter 7: Light-Handed Regulation of Airports: The Way to Go? -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The History of and Rationale for Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.3 What Is Light-Handed Regulation? -- 7.3.1 The Ex Post Nature -- 7.3.2 Upward Price Flexibility. ; 7.3.3 The Ability of Parties to Negotiate -- 7.3.4 The Probability of Sanction -- 7.3.5 Other Characteristics -- 7.3.5.1 Formal or Informal -- 7.3.5.2 Independent and Dependent Regulators -- 7.3.5.3 Monitoring/Benchmarking -- 7.3.5.4 Review Criteria -- 7.3.6 LHR: Content or Process? -- 7.4 Models of Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.4.1 The Review/Sanction Model -- 7.4.2 The Negotiate/Arbitrate Model -- 7.5 The Working of Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.6 LHR and Performance -- 7.6.1 Expectations -- 7.6.1.1 Use of Market Power -- 7.6.1.2 Productive Efficiency -- 7.6.1.3 Service Quality -- 7.6.1.4 Non-Aeronautical Revenue -- 7.6.1.5 Investment -- 7.6.2 LHR in Practice -- 7.6.2.1 Use of Market Power -- 7.6.2.2 Productive Efficiency -- 7.6.2.3 Non-Aeronautical Revenues -- 7.6.2.4 Investment -- 7.7 Light-Handed Regulation: A Model to Follow? -- 7.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 8: Optimising Investment in Regulated Airports -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Regulating Airport Investment -- 8.2.1 Privatisation and Investments -- 8.2.2 Investment Dynamics -- 8.2.3 Conflicting Goals and Complexities -- 8.3 Efficiency and Distributional Objectives in Regulating Airports -- 8.3.1 Short-Run Optimisation: Use of Fixed Capacity -- 8.3.2 Regulating Quality -- 8.3.3 Achieving Productive Efficiency in the Short Run -- 8.3.4 Long-Run Optimisation: Achieving Efficient Investment in Capacity -- 8.3.5 Productive Efficiency in the Long Run -- 8.3.6 Distributional Objectives -- 8.4 Instruments of Regulation -- 8.4.1 Price Regulation -- 8.4.2 Cost-Based Regulation -- 8.4.3 Incentive Regulation -- 8.4.4 Light-Handed Regulation -- 8.4.5 Airport Slots -- 8.4.6 Conditional Triggers -- 8.5 Regulating Airport Investments: Assessing the Options -- 8.6 Improving Regulation Via More Sophisticated Approaches -- 8.6.1 Introducing Quality Incentives -- 8.6.2 Introducing Slots. ; 8.6.3 Introducing Conditional Triggers -- 8.6.4 Systems of Regulation: A Revised Comparison -- 8.6.5 Summary -- 8.7 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 9: European Airport Reform: Slots and the Implicit Contract Between Airlines and Airports -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Outline of the European Airport System -- 9.2.1 Some Facts about the System -- 9.2.2 Aspects of Performance -- 9.2.2.1 Allocative Efficiency in the Short Run -- 9.2.2.2 Cost Efficiency -- 9.2.2.3 Provision of Capacity -- 9.2.2.4 Options for Commercial Activities -- 9.2.2.5 Connectivity and Regional Aspects -- 9.2.2.6 Quality -- 9.2.2.7 Environmental Externalities -- 9.2.3 Institutions -- 9.2.3.1 Ownership -- 9.2.3.2 Competition -- 9.2.3.3 Regulation -- 9.2.3.4 The Slot System -- 9.2.3.5 The Planning Environment -- 9.2.4 Interest Groups -- 9.2.4.1 Passengers and Shippers -- 9.2.4.2 Airlines -- 9.2.4.3 Airports -- 9.2.4.4 Governments and Regulators -- 9.2.4.5 Local Communities -- 9.3 How Well Are European Airports Performing? -- 9.3.1 Allocative Efficiency -- 9.3.2 Cost Efficiency -- 9.3.3 Provision of Capacity -- 9.3.4 Other Aspects -- 9.4 Implicit Airline-Airport Contracts -- 9.4.1 Airports with Adequate Capacity -- 9.4.2 Busy Airports -- 9.4.3 Options for Reform -- 9.5 Conclusions -- References -- Part II: Benchmarking -- Chapter 10: Efficiency Assessment of Airports and the Impact of Regulation on Performance -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Airport Efficiency Estimation -- 10.2.1 Total Factor Productivity -- 10.2.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis -- 10.2.3 Data Envelopment Analysis -- 10.2.4 Comparing Index Number TFP, SFA and DEA -- 10.3 Impact of Regulation on Airport Performance -- 10.4 Conclusions and Future Directions -- References -- Chapter 11: Methodology Choices for Benchmarking Airports -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Link Between the Use and Format of Benchmarking -- 11.2.1 Assess Managerial or Firm Performance.
• Sommario/riassunto: This book offers new insights into the theory and practice of economic airport regulation. In light of recent developments in aviation markets and policy, and the debate on airport regulation and benchmarking, it offers case studies on various aspects of economic regulation of city and regional airports. Written by experts in the field, the volume features contributions on the theory of regulation and benchmarking, as well as case studies on recent experiences in Europe and Latin America. This book is divided into three parts: Part I provides the theoretical background for the study of airport regulation and regulatory systems. Competition at airports is discussed, as are common forms of regulation and potential pitfalls. Part II addresses benchmarking, as benchmarking is often applied as an input to the regulatory process. Although benchmarking is necessary, reviews of how benchmarking is applied in the literature and in practice show that improvements can be made. Part III provides case studies on real-world examples. Addressing the question of whether and how European airport regulators set incentives for efficiency, and how benchmarking is used in the regulatory process, this book is an important contribution to the development of the transport industry in Europe and Latin America. It will appeal to scholars and students in transport economics, regional economics and related fields, as well as to practitioners and policy makers in the transport industry.
• Titolo autorizzato: Economic Regulation of Urban and Regional Airports
• ISBN: 9783031203411; 9783031203398
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910720061703321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Advances in spatial science.