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Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline? / / prepared by Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody



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Autore: Fabrizio Stefania Visualizza persona
Titolo: Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline? / / prepared by Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, European Dept., 2006
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (53 p.)
Soggetto topico: Budget - European Union countries - Econometric models
Fiscal policy - European Union countries - Econometric models
Elections - Economic aspects - European Union countries
Altri autori: ModyAshoka  
Note generali: "May 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE: A SELECTIVE LITERATURE REVIEW""; ""III. BUDGET INSTITUTIONS IN NEW AND POTENTIAL EU MEMBER STATES""; ""IV. BENCHMARK RESULTS""; ""V. THE ROLE OF DEEPER DETERMINANTS: TIME-INVARIANT FACTORS""; ""VI. DIFFERENTIATING THE EFFECTS ON EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.
Titolo autorizzato: Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-9622-4
1-4527-0575-5
1-282-44793-9
1-4519-8725-0
9786613821133
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910814668103321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/123.