Vai al contenuto principale della pagina

The litigation state [[electronic resource] ] : public regulation and private lawsuits in the U.S. / / Sean Farhang



(Visualizza in formato marc)    (Visualizza in BIBFRAME)

Autore: Farhang Sean Visualizza persona
Titolo: The litigation state [[electronic resource] ] : public regulation and private lawsuits in the U.S. / / Sean Farhang Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, 2010
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (321 p.)
Disciplina: 347.7/305
Soggetto topico: Civil procedure - United States
Federal government - United States
Actions and defenses - United States
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: pt. 1. Private enforcement regimes in general -- pt. 2. Enforcement regimes and civil rights.
Sommario/riassunto: Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents. Farhang reveals that private lawsuits, functioning as an enforcement resource, are a profoundly important component of American state capacity. He demonstrates how the distinctive institutional structure of the American state--particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy--encourages Congress to incentivize private lawsuits. Congress thereby achieves regulatory aims through a decentralized army of private lawyers, rather than by well-staffed bureaucracies under the president's influence. The historical development of ideological polarization between Congress and the president since the late 1960's has been a powerful cause of the explosion of private lawsuits enforcing federal law over the same period. Using data from many policy areas spanning the twentieth century, and historical analysis focused on civil rights, The Litigation State investigates how American political institutions shape the strategic design of legislation to mobilize private lawsuits for policy implementation.
Titolo autorizzato: The litigation state  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-282-64510-2
9786612645105
1-4008-3678-6
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910784938403321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: Princeton studies in American politics.