Political Corruption and Organizational Crime : The Grey Fringes of Democracy and the Private Economy / / edited by Elizangela Valarini, Markus Pohlmann, Subrata Mitra

• Pubblicazione: Wiesbaden : , : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden : , : Imprint : Springer VS, , 2021
• Edizione: 1st ed. 2021.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (425 pages)
• Disciplina: 364.1323
• Soggetto topico: Europe - Politics and government; Elections; European Politics; Electoral Politics
• Persona (resp. second.): ValariniElizangela; PohlmannMarkus; MitraSubrata
• Nota di contenuto: ORGANISATIONAL WRONG-DOING IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CULTURE, CONTEXT AND COMPARATIVE THEORY -- MAKING ELECTIONS WORK: CAMPAIGN CASH, MARKETISATION OF VOTES AND SOCIAL NEGOTIATION IN INDIA -- DEMOCRACY, ELECTORAL PROCESS AND CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE IN INDIA: A STUDY OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE IN CHEVELLA PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY, TELANGANA STATE -- POLITICAL FINANCE REGIMES, POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA -- ‘CULTURE’, CRIMINALITY AND COLLECTIVE MINDSET: POLITICAL FINANCING IN BRAZIL -- FIGHTING CRIMINAL CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL: ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE ELECTORAL ARENA -- BALANCING REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL FINANCING: THE REGULATION OF COMPETING LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RESOURCES IN COLOMBIA -- CORRUPTION TRIALS IN ARGENTINA: JUSTICE DELAYED? -- MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN BRAZIL: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN BRAZIL: A POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACH -- MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN BRAZIL: A POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACH -- MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL GAIN? BRAZILIAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN CORRUPTION SCANDALS -- LAWYERS AS ENABLES OF WRONGDOING: CHALLENGES FACED BY DEMOCRACIES REGARDING CORROPTION AND MONEY LAUDERING -- PARTY FINANCING SCANDALS IN THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: THE FLICK AFFAIR AND CDU DONATIONS AFFAIR -- PARTY FINANCING IN GERMANY: A CRITIQUE -- CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORRUPTION IN GERMAN PARLIAMENTS -- THE FINANCING OF FRENCH POLITICAL LIFE: FROM SELF-CONTROL TO SELF-INTERESTED REGULATION -- NON-COMPLIANCE, ORGANIZATIONAL DEVIANCE AND USEFUL ILLEGALITY: TOWARDS A UNIFIED AGENDA OF RESEARCH.
• Sommario/riassunto: Level of compliance - one of the most important prerequisites of good governance - varies widely across countries of the Global North and the less developed, Global South. Acts of non-compliance, such as electoral irregularities, dubious deals between private and public sectors, questionable role of the justice systems and financial scandals, though they vary greatly across countries, are an omnipresent reality of contemporary life. This volume has brought together a number of case studies of such deviant behavior in political, juridical and corporate fields, from several countries of Asia, Europe and South America, within a common framework. Instead of a moral approach based exclusively on the legality and illegality of the act, the authors of these essays dissect non-compliance analytically, taking culture and context into account. They argue that, while criminal and corrupt dealings deserve to be exposed by all means from an ethical point of view, seen from an interdisciplinary angle, one needs to probe deeper into the dynamic that leads to such non-compliance with the law in the first place. The Editors Elizangela Valarini is a postdoctoral researcher at Max-Weber-Institute of Heidelberg University. Markus Pohlmann is Professor of Sociology at Max-Weber-Institute of Heidelberg University. Subrata Mitra is emeritus Professor of Political Science at Heidelberg University, and Adjunct Professor, Dublin City University, Ireland.
• Titolo autorizzato: Political Corruption and Organizational Crime
• ISBN: 3-658-34374-5
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910502654703321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Organization, Management and Crime - Organisation, Management und Kriminalität, . 2945-9850