From conflict to coalition : profit-sharing institutions and the political economy of trade / / Adam Dean [[electronic resource]]

• Autore: Dean Adam <1984->
• Pubblicazione: New York : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2016
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xi, 225 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Disciplina: 331.2/1647
• Soggetto topico: Labor unions; Commercial policy; Profit-sharing; Collective bargaining; Industrial relations
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 06 Sep 2016).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Half-title; Series page; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Current Explanations; Structure of the Book; 2 A Theory of Profit-Sharing Institutions; International Trade and Wages; From Disagreement to Opposition; Bargaining Power and Uncertainty; The Balance of Bargaining Power; Sources of Labor's Bargaining Power; The Limits of Bargaining; Uncertainty Concerning the Balance of Bargaining Power; Uncertainty Concerning Profitability; Enforcement and Commitment Problems ; From Conflict to Coalition: Creation of Profit-sharing InstitutionsUnion Recognition; Agreement that Wages will Rise with Profits; Industry-Wide Unionization; Conclusion; 3 Evidence and Research Design; Operationalizing the Dependent Variable; Archival Research and Trade Policy Preferences; Labor Unions and Methodological Bias; Qualitative Case Selection; Late Nineteenth-Century America; The American Textile and Steel Industries; American Trade Liberalization Following World War II; Britain and Argentina; Testing Causal Mechanisms ; Profit-Sharing Institutions and Workers' Trade Policy PreferencesWorkers' Bargaining Power and Profit-Sharing Institutions; International Trade Policy and Workers' Wages; Conclusion; 4 The Gilded Wage; The Political Economy of American Trade Policy; Trade Politics in the American Textile Industry; Institutional Absence: Textile Workers, 1873-1884; Capital-Labor Disagreement: Textile Workers, 1873-1884; ""A New and Brighter Era": Profit-Sharing in the Textile Industry; Textile Workers' Support for High Tariffs; Trade Politics in the American Steel Industry ; The Sons of Vulcan: Steel and the Civil WarCapital-Labor Agreement: Steel and Profit-Sharing; Institutional Destruction: Homestead and Steelworkers, 1889-1892; Steelworkers' Lack of Support for High Tariffs; Cross-case Comparisons - Textiles and Steel; Immigration and Trade Policy Preferences; Homestead and the Presidential Election of 1892; Conclusion; 5 Liberalized by Labor; American Labor Markets During the Great Depression; Unskilled Workers and Mass Production Industries; Skilled Workers and the American Federation of Labor; Workers' Trade Policy Preferences in the 1930s ; The CIO's Skepticism Concerning Free TradeThe AFL's Trade Protectionism; The Wagner Act and Profit-sharing Institutions; Workers' Trade Policy Preferences in the 1940s; The CIO's New Support for Free Trade; The AFL's Continued Protectionism; American Trade Liberalization Following World War II; Debating the Causes of American Trade Liberalization; Quantitative Analysis; Dependent and Independent Variables; Control Variables; Additional Measures of Union Density; Main Results; Conclusion; 6 Trade Politics in Britain and Argentina; Britain and the Repeal of the Corn Laws ; Repression and Labor Market Institutions
• Sommario/riassunto: International trade often inspires intense conflict between workers and their employers. In this book, Adam Dean studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies. Dean argues that capital-labor agreement on trade policy depends on the presence of 'profit-sharing institutions'. He tests this theory through case studies from the United States, Britain, and Argentina in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; they offer a revisionist history placing class conflict at the center of the political economy of trade. Analysis of data from more than one hundred countries from 1986 to 2002 demonstrates that the field's conventional wisdom systematically exaggerates the benefits that workers receive from trade policy reforms. From Conflict to Coalition boldly explains why labor is neither an automatic beneficiary nor an automatic ally of capital when it comes to trade policy and distributional conflict.
• Titolo autorizzato: From conflict to coalition
• ISBN: 1-316-73378-5; 1-316-73185-5; 1-316-74536-8; 1-316-74729-8; 1-316-61973-7; 1-316-71759-3; 1-316-75501-0; 1-316-74922-3
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910136607803321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Political economy of institutions and decisions.