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War and democratic constraint : how the public influences foreign policy / / Matthew A. Baum, Philip B. K. Potter



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Autore: Baum Matthew <1965-> Visualizza persona
Titolo: War and democratic constraint : how the public influences foreign policy / / Matthew A. Baum, Philip B. K. Potter Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, New Jersey : , : Princeton University Press, , 2015
©2015
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (275 ) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina: 327.1
Soggetto topico: International relations - Public opinion
International relations - Decision making - Citizen participation
Political participation
Soggetto non controllato: Afghanistan invasion
Downsian Premise
Germany
Internet
Iraq War
Iraq coalition
Poland
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
audience costs
coalition joining
communication
conflict behavior
conflict initiation
conflict reciprocation
conflicts
credibility
crisis bargaining
democracies
democratic constraint
democratic peace
domestic politics
electoral institutions
elites
foreign policy
government policy
information
international relations
leaders
media access
media coverage
media
military conflicts
multiparty systems
newspapers
political communication
political opposition
political parties
press freedom
principal-agent theory
public opinion
satellite television
threats
troop commitment
whistleblowers
Classificazione: POL011000POL016000POL028000SOC052000
Persona (resp. second.): PotterPhilip B. K.
Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Introduction: Looking for Democratic Constraint -- Chapter 2. Democracies Are Not Created Equal: A Theory of Democratic Constraint -- Chapter 3. Democratic Constraint, the Democratic Peace, and Conflict Initiation -- Chapter 4. Looking for Audience Costs in All the Wrong Places: Constraint and Reciprocation -- Chapter 5. Willing and Politically Able: Democratic Constraint and Coalition Joining -- Chapter 6. Downs Meets the Press: How Party Systems Shape the News -- Chapter 7. Coalition Stories: Cases from the Iraq Coalition -- Chapter 8. Conclusion: Information, Constraint, and Democratic Foreign Policy -- References -- Index
Sommario/riassunto: Why do some democracies reflect their citizens' foreign policy preferences better than others? What roles do the media, political parties, and the electoral system play in a democracy's decision to join or avoid a war? War and Democratic Constraint shows that the key to how a government determines foreign policy rests on the transmission and availability of information. Citizens successfully hold their democratic governments accountable and a distinctive foreign policy emerges when two vital institutions-a diverse and independent political opposition and a robust media-are present to make timely information accessible.Matthew Baum and Philip Potter demonstrate that there must first be a politically potent opposition that can blow the whistle when a leader missteps. This counteracts leaders' incentives to obscure and misrepresent. Second, healthy media institutions must be in place and widely accessible in order to relay information from whistle-blowers to the public. Baum and Potter explore this communication mechanism during three different phases of international conflicts: when states initiate wars, when they respond to challenges from other states, or when they join preexisting groups of actors engaged in conflicts.Examining recent wars, including those in Afghanistan and Iraq, War and Democratic Constraint links domestic politics and mass media to international relations in a brand-new way.
Titolo autorizzato: War and democratic constraint  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 0-691-16523-8
1-4008-6647-2
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910817183903321
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