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The Immaterial Self [[electronic resource] ] : A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind



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Autore: Foster John Visualizza persona
Titolo: The Immaterial Self [[electronic resource] ] : A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Hoboken, : Taylor and Francis, 2002
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (309 p.)
Disciplina: 128/.2
147.4
Soggetto topico: Descartes, René
Dualism
Mind and body
Philosophy of mind
Speculative Philosophy
Philosophy
Philosophy & Religion
Soggetto genere / forma: Electronic books.
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di contenuto: Book Cover; Title; Contents; Preface; THE DUALIST DOCTRINE; NIHILISM AND ANALYTICAL BEHAVIOURISM; ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM; THE TYPE-IDENTITY THESIS; TOKEN-IDENTITY AND METAPHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM; TOKEN-IDENTITY AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSATION; THE MENTAL SUBJECT; PERSONAL IDENTITY, EMBODIMENT, AND FREEDOM; Notes; Bibliography; Index
Sommario/riassunto: Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self.John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current phil
Titolo autorizzato: The Immaterial Self  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 9786610182244
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910451243903321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: International Library of Philosophy