Theories of Legal Obligation

• Autore: Beyleveld Deryck
• Pubblicazione: Cham : , : Springer International Publishing AG, , 2024; ©2024
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (0 pages)
• Altri autori: BerteaStefano
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I: What a Legal Obligation Is -- Towards a Minimal Concept of Legal Obligation -- 1 A Reason-Based Construction of Legal Obligation -- 2 Necessary Properties -- 2.1 Ontological Ideality -- 2.2 Reference to an Action -- 2.3 Reference to a Person -- 2.4 Normative Requirement -- 3 Non-necessary Properties -- 3.1 Reference to an Obligee -- 3.2 Reference to an Obligating Person -- 3.3 Sanctionability -- 4 Summary -- References -- What Is a Legal Obligation? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 3 What Legal Obligation Is -- 3.1 Legal Obligation: Abstract -- 3.2 Legal Obligation: Ideational -- 3.3 Legal Obligation: Public -- 3.4 Legal Obligation: Ontologically an Object -- 3.5 Legal Obligation: Sui Generis -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Part II: Theoretical Perspectives on Legal Obligation -- Why Any Legal Positivist Idea of Legal Obligation Is Untenable: A Kantian-Gewirthian Synthesis -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 My Dispute with Legal Positivism -- 1.2 The Nature of My Argument -- 2 The Argument -- 2.1 There Can Be Only One Categorical Imperative -- 2.2 Conditions to Prove the Existence of a Categorical Imperative -- 2.3 The First Condition -- 2.4 The Second Condition -- 2.4.1 Agnes Must Act in Accord with Her Need for the GCAs -- 2.4.2 Agnes Must Value Action in Accord with Other Agents' Need for the GCAs Equally -- 2.5 Coherence of the Concept of a Categorical Imperative -- 3 What Is Free Will as the Ratio Essendi of the Categorical Imperative? -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- Gustav Radbruch's Theory of Legal Obligation -- 1 The Reception of Radbruch's Legal Philosophy in the English Debate -- 1.1 Translations of Radbruch's Works into English -- 1.2 Neo-Kantianism as Radbruch's Philosophical Foundation -- 1.3 H.L.A. Hart's Verdict -- 1.4 The Radbruch Formula in Robert Alexy's Works. ; 1.5 Radbruch's Complex Non-Positivistic Theory -- 2 Legal Obligation as a Normative Entity -- 3 Key Elements of Radbruch's Legal Philosophy -- 3.1 Reality and Value -- 3.2 The Separation of 'Is' and 'Ought': Methodendualismus -- 3.3 Radbruch's Version of Relativism -- 4 The Concept and the Validity of Law -- 4.1 Radbruch's Concept of Law -- 4.2 Radbruch's Theory of the Validity of Law -- 5 Radbruch on Legal Obligation -- 5.1 Legal Obligation as an A Priori Concept -- 5.2 Morality as the Only Justification for Legal Obligation -- 5.3 Radbruch's Dual Theory of Validity -- 5.3.1 Legal Validity from the Standpoint of the Individual -- 5.3.2 Legal Validity from the Standpoint of the Judge -- 5.3.3 Conflicting Results from Different Standpoints -- 5.3.4 Radbruch's Renunciation of the Dual Theory of Legal Validity -- 6 A Critical Evaluation of Radbruch's Dual Theory of Validity and His Conception of Legal Obligation -- 6.1 Is Radbruch's Dual Theory of Legal Validity Positivistic? -- 6.2 On the Certainty of Cognition of Iniquitous Statutes -- 6.3 Radbruch's Dual Legal Obligation -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Part III: Forms of Legal Obligation -- Is There a Legal Duty Not to Harm in Tort Law? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Three Arguments Against the Existence of a Legal Duty Not to Harm -- 2.1 It Is Not Explicitly Recognised in Its Legislation -- 2.2 It Makes Social Life Impracticable -- 2.3 The Purported Duty Not to Harm Is Useless -- 3 Building the Case for the Existence of a Legal Duty Not to Harm -- 3.1 What Is a Legal Duty or Obligation? -- 3.2 Normatively Ideal Worlds in Tort Law -- 3.3 The Role of Criminal Law in Strengthening Tort Law's Normative Structure -- 3.4 Making Sense of Prevention Trends in Current Tort Law -- 3.5 The Obligation Not to Harm, Duties of Care, and Reasons for Action -- 4 Final Remarks -- References. ; Reflections on the Justifiability of Authority: Raz vs. Wolff -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Wolff's Anarchist Argument: A Brief Exposition -- 3 The Razian Response: A Brief Exposition -- 4 What Implications Follow from the Service Conception for the Relation Between Authority and Autonomy? -- 5 The Service Conception: Two Problems and an Open Question -- 5.1 Positive Second-Order Reasons and the Case for Authority -- 5.2 The Challenge from Justified Disobedience Situations -- 5.3 Does the NJT Contain a False Dichotomy? -- 6 Conclusion -- References.
• Titolo autorizzato: Theories of Legal Obligation
• ISBN: 3-031-54067-0
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910847581403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Law and Philosophy Library