Political Risk Aversion / / Laura Valderrama

• Autore: Valderrama Laura
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 26 p. : ill
• Disciplina: 338.04;338.0409
• Soggetto topico: Uncertainty; Rational expectations (Economic theory); Labor; Industries: Information Technololgy; Production and Operations Management; Inventions; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General; Macroeconomics: Production; Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers; Information technology industries; Technology; general issues; Macroeconomics; Inventions & inventors; Labour; income economics; Emerging technologies; Productivity; Technological innovation; Labor mobility; Industrial productivity; Technological innovations
• Soggetto geografico: China, People's Republic of
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Basic Model -- A. Economic Environment -- B. Technology Choice -- C. Aggregate Uncertainty -- III. Institutional Reform -- A. Outside Ownership -- B. Endogenizing Ownership -- C. Dominated Employee Ownership -- IV. Efficieny, Innovation, and Labor Mobility -- A. Partnership Efficiency -- 1. Technological and Institutional Efficiency -- B. Institutional Efficiency -- 2. Endogeneous ownership -- V. Discussion -- A. How does the model fit the facts? -- B. Foundations of Individual Uncertainty -- C. Heterogeneous Investors -- VI. Related Literature -- VII. Concluding Remarks -- References -- Footnotes.
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show a non-monotonic relationship between institutional efficiency and the size of innovation.
• Titolo autorizzato: Political Risk Aversion
• ISBN: 1-4623-9108-7; 1-4527-0970-X; 1-282-84403-2; 1-4518-7341-7; 9786612844034
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910828554803321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/194