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Autore: | Crowe Christopher |
Titolo: | Central Bank Independence and Transparency : : Evolution and Effectiveness / / Christopher Crowe, Ellen Meade |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (30 p.) |
Disciplina: | 332.11 |
Soggetto topico: | Banks and banking, Central |
Autonomy | |
Monetary policy | |
Banks and Banking | |
Foreign Exchange | |
Inflation | |
Monetary Systems | |
Standards | |
Regimes | |
Government and the Monetary System | |
Payment Systems | |
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy | |
Monetary Policy | |
Central Banks and Their Policies | |
Banks | |
Depository Institutions | |
Micro Finance Institutions | |
Mortgages | |
Price Level | |
Deflation | |
Banking | |
Macroeconomics | |
Currency | |
Foreign exchange | |
Central bank autonomy | |
Exchange rate arrangements | |
Central bank transparency | |
Central banks | |
Prices | |
Exchange rate flexibility | |
Banks and banking | |
Soggetto geografico: | United Kingdom |
Altri autori: | MeadeEllen |
Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Measures of Central Bank Independence; Text Tables; 1. Mean Level (Later Period) and Change in CBI; III. Measures of Central Bank Transparency; 2. Correlates with Change in CBI Index, D.CBI; 3. Mean Level (Later Period) and Change in Transparency; IV. Effects of Central Bank Independence; 4. Correlates with Transparency Score, TRANS1; 5. CBI and Inflation (INF): OLS Regression Results; 6. D.CBI and Inlfation (D.INF) IV Regression Results; V. Effects of Transparency; 7. Transparency and Use of Private Information; VI. Conclusions |
Appendix: Data Sources and Variables UsedAppendix Tables; A1. Country Samples; A2. Construction and Coding of Transparency Measure; References | |
Sommario/riassunto: | This paper examines the current level of central bank independence (CBI) and transparency in a broad sample of countries using newly constructed measures, and looks at the evolution in both measures from an earlier time period. Increases in CBI have tended to occur in more democratic countries and in countries with high levels of past inflation. More independent central banks in turn tend to be more transparent, while transparency is also positively correlated with measures of national institutional quality. Exploiting the time dimension of our data to eliminate country fixed effects and using instrumental variable estimation to overcome endogeneity concerns, we present evidence that greater CBI is associated with lower inflation. We also find that enhanced transparency practices are associated with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Central Bank Independence and Transparency |
ISBN: | 1-4623-7396-8 |
1-4527-8944-4 | |
1-282-84073-8 | |
9786612840739 | |
1-4518-6979-7 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910789097403321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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