Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She)

• Autore: Osborne Martin J.
• Pubblicazione: Cambridge, UK : , : Open Book Publishers, , 2023; ©2023
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (382 pages)
• Disciplina: 338.5
• Soggetto topico: Microeconomics
• Altri autori: RubinsteinAriel
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (pages 347-353) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion -- Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes -- 7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model. ; 10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor -- Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium -- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium -- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 16 Extensive games -- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium -- 16.2 What is a strategy? -- 16.3 Backward induction -- 16.4 Bargaining -- 16.5 Repeated games -- Problems -- Notes -- Part IV Topics -- 17 Mechanism design -- 17.1 Deciding on a public project -- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms -- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism -- Problems -- Notes -- 18 Matching -- 18.1 The matching problem -- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm -- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability -- Problems -- Notes -- 19 Socialism -- 19.1 Model -- 19.2 Properties of economic systems -- 19.3 Characterization of socialism. ; Problems -- Notes -- 20 Aggregating preferences -- 20.1 Social preferences -- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions -- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions -- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem -- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- Problems -- Notes -- References -- Index.
• Sommario/riassunto: Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
• Altri titoli varianti: Models in Microeconomic Theory
• Titolo autorizzato: Models in Microeconomic Theory
• ISBN: 1-80511-123-X
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910774775703321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II