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Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy : 3rd International Conference MARBLE 2022, Vilamoura, Portugal / / edited by Panos Pardalos, Ilias Kotsireas, Yike Guo, William Knottenbelt



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Titolo: Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy : 3rd International Conference MARBLE 2022, Vilamoura, Portugal / / edited by Panos Pardalos, Ilias Kotsireas, Yike Guo, William Knottenbelt Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Edizione: 1st ed. 2023.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (274 pages)
Disciplina: 296
Soggetto topico: Financial services industry
Mathematical optimization
Econometrics
Computer science - Mathematics
Business enterprises - Finance
Financial Services
Optimization
Quantitative Economics
Mathematical Applications in Computer Science
Corporate Finance
Persona (resp. second.): PardalosPanos
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Towards Equity in Proof-of-Work Mining Rewards -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background & -- Related Work -- 2.1 Reward Protocols -- 2.2 Reward Analyses -- 3 Computational Coinage Framework -- 3.1 Miner Metrics -- 3.2 Blockchain Metrics -- 3.3 Coin Metrics -- 4 Inequity in Bitcoin -- 4.1 Inequitable Hash-Time-to-Issuance -- 4.2 An Increasing Hashcap-to-Coinage Ratio -- 4.3 Subsidy Through the Fungibility Dilution Factor -- 4.4 An Increasing Hash-Restitution Time -- 5 Equitable Reward Constraints -- 5.1 Undiluted Reward Constraints -- 5.2 Prompt Restitution Constraints -- 5.3 Equitable Coin Supply Growth -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Market Equilibria and Risk Diversification in Blockchain Mining Economies -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Model: Mining Economies -- 3 Proportional Response Dynamics -- 4 Experiments -- 4.1 Data Set and Experimental Setup -- 4.2 Empirical Results -- 5 Conclusions -- A Technical Materials: Proof of Theorem 1 -- References -- On the Impact of Vote Delegation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Literature on Vote Delegation -- 3 Model -- 4 Results -- 4.1 Free Delegation -- 4.2 Capped Delegation -- 4.3 Asymptotic Behavior of Delegation -- 5 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Decentralized Governance of Stablecoins with Closed Form Valuation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Model -- 3 Stackelberg Equilibrium Analysis -- 3.1 TEXT w/o Participation Constraint -- 3.2 TEXT w/ Participation Constraint -- 4 Governance Attack Vector -- 5 Conclusion -- A Derivative Analysis -- A.1 Sensitivity of the Expected Collateral Shortfall -- A.2 Vault Objective Sensitivities -- A.3 GOV Objective Sensitivities -- B Proofs -- References -- Griefing Factors and Evolutionary In-Stabilities in Blockchain Mining Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Model and Nash Equilibrium Allocations.
3 Evolutionary Stable Allocations and Griefing Factors -- 4 Griefing in Blockchain Mining -- 5 Dynamic Adjustments of Mining Allocations -- 6 Conclusions and Open Questions -- A Omitted Proofs -- References -- Data-Driven Analysis of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Projects Drivers -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) -- 2.2 CBDC Project Index (CBDCPI) -- 3 Data and Methodology -- 3.1 Data -- 3.2 Methodology -- 4 Results -- 5 Conclusion -- A Appendix -- A.1 CBDC Projects Status -- A.2 Top 10 Features for the Random Forest Classifier with Aggregated Data -- A.3 Top 10 Features for the Random Forest Classifier with Full Data -- References -- Dissimilar Redundancy in DeFi -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Smart Contracts -- 2.2 Scaling Solutions -- 2.3 Smart Contract Vulnerabilities -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 Overview -- 3.2 The Technical Challenges -- 4 Evaluation -- 4.1 Development-Time Testing -- 4.2 Real-World Deployment -- 5 Limitations -- 5.1 Transaction Fees -- 5.2 Development Cost -- 5.3 Storage Layout -- 6 Related work -- 6.1 Ethereum Clients -- 6.2 Differential Fuzzing -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- DeFi Survival Analysis: Insights into Risks and User Behaviors -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Methods -- 2.1 Data -- 2.2 Survival Analysis for DeFi -- 3 Results -- 3.1 What do Users do After a Deposit? -- 3.2 How Long Until Borrows are Repaid or Liquidated? -- 3.3 How Does Coin Type Influence Liquidations? -- 4 Related Work -- 5 Discussion and Future Work -- References -- Gas Gauge: A Security Analysis Tool for Smart Contract Out-of-Gas Vulnerabilities -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Contributions -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Out-of-Gas Denial of Service Vulnerabilities -- 3 Description of Gas Gauge -- 3.1 Detection Phase -- 3.2 Identification Phase -- 3.3 Correction Phase -- 4 Experimental Evaluation.
4.1 Evaluation of the Detection Phase -- 4.2 Performance Analysis of the Detection Phase -- 4.3 Evaluation of the Identification Phase -- 4.4 The Evaluation of the Correction Phase -- 4.5 Limitations of Gas Gauge -- 5 Case Study -- 6 Related Work -- 7 Conclusions and Future Work -- Appendix A Threshold Calculator Code Modification -- Appendix B Code Modification for Nested Loops -- Appendix C Output of the Correction Phase -- Appendix D Experimental Setup -- Appendix E Factors Impacting the Run-time of the Detection Phase -- Appendix F Evaluation of the Methods for the Identification Phase -- References -- Tweakable mathcalSleeve: A Novel mathcalSleeve Construction Based on Tweakable Hash Functions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 3 The Tweakable mathcalSleeve -- 3.1 The Generic Sleeve: GenmathcalSleeve -- 4 Security Analysis -- 4.1 Generic Attack Security and Unforgeability of Fallback Scheme -- 4.2 Tweakable mathcalSleeve is at Least as Secure as an ECDSA One -- 4.3 The Security of GenmathcalSleeve -- 5 Implementation and Performance -- 6 Formal Methods Analysis -- 7 Final Remarks -- A High-level Diagram of the Tweakable mathcalSleeve Construction -- References -- Interhead Hydra: Two Heads are Better than One -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 3 Overview -- 3.1 The General Setting -- 3.2 The Approach -- 3.3 Desired Properties and Challenges -- 4 The State Machine -- 4.1 The Interhead State Machine -- 5 The Protocols -- 6 Analysis -- 6.1 Security -- 7 Conclusion -- A In-Depth Background -- A.1 EUTxOMA -- A.2 Thread Token -- B Hydra-Specific Concepts -- B.1 General Purpose Token -- B.2 The Multi-Threaded CEM -- C The CEM Construction -- C.1 Parameters -- C.2 The Orderly Phase -- C.3 The Conversion Phase -- C.4 The Punish Phase -- References -- Prediction Markets, Automated Market Makers, and Decentralized Finance (DeFi).
1 Introduction -- 2 Existing Models for Prediction Market Makers -- 2.1 Prediction Market and Market Makers -- 2.2 Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules (LMSR) -- 2.3 Constant Product/Sum/Mean AMMs -- 3 Constant Ellipse AMMs -- 4 Supply-and-Demand, Liquid Sensitivity, and Price Fluctuation -- 4.1 LS-LMSR -- 4.2 Constant Product and Constant Mean -- 4.3 Constant Ellipse -- 4.4 Front Running Attacks Based on Slippage -- 5 Price Amplitude -- 6 Implementation and Performance -- 6.1 Gas Cost and Comparison -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Wombat-An Efficient Stableswap Algorithm -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Wombat's Design -- 2.1 Wombat's Invariant Curve -- 2.2 Enhanced Wombat's Invariant Curve -- 2.3 Gas Comparison -- 2.4 Swap Mechanism -- 2.5 Slippage Analysis -- 3 Desirable Properties of AMMs -- 3.1 Path Independence -- 3.2 Liquidity Sensitivity -- 4 Arbitrage Block -- 4.1 Changes in the Asset and Liability -- 4.2 Maintain Global Equilibrium with r*=1 -- 4.3 Withdrawal Fees and Deposit Gains -- 5 Swap with Haircut Fees -- 6 Exact Swap, Withdraw, and Deposit when r*=1 -- 7 Conclusions -- A Screenshots of Uniswap and Curve -- B Proof of Theorem 2 -- References -- Multi-Tier Reputation for Data Cooperatives -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Problem Definition and Motivation -- 1.2 Our Contributions -- 1.3 Organization of the Paper -- 2 Literature Review -- 2.1 Data Cooperatives -- 2.2 Blockchain Systems -- 2.3 Reputation Systems: Formalization -- 2.4 Multi-Tier Selection Protocol -- 3 Description of the Proposed Blockchain System -- 3.1 Design Requirements for Data Cooperative -- 3.2 Architecture Overview -- 3.3 Choice of Blockchain System -- 3.4 Choice of Reputation System -- 3.5 Reputation as Weighted-Stake -- 4 Security Analysis -- 5 Experimental Results and Discussion -- 5.1 Datasets -- 5.2 Experiments and Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- References.
Sommario/riassunto: This book presents the best papers from the 3rd International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE) 2022, held in Vilamoura, Portugal. While most blockchain conferences and forums are dedicated to business applications, product development or Initial Coin Offering (ICO) launches, this conference focused on the mathematics behind blockchain to bridge the gap between practice and theory. Blockchain Technology has been considered as the most fundamental and revolutionising invention since the Internet. Every year, thousands of blockchain projects are launched and circulated in the market, and there is a tremendous wealth of blockchain applications, from finance to healthcare, education, media, logistics and more. However, due to theoretical and technical barriers, most of these applications are impractical for use in a real-world business context. The papers in this book reveal the challenges and limitations, such as scalability, latency, privacy and security, and showcase solutions and developments to overcome them.
Titolo autorizzato: Mathematical research for blockchain economy  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 3-031-18679-6
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910672438603321
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Serie: Lecture Notes in Operations Research, . 2731-0418