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Autore: |
Trinh Vu Quang
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Titolo: |
Fundamentals of board busyness and corporate governance / / Vu Quang Trinh
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Pubblicazione: | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] |
©2022 | |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (105 pages) |
Disciplina: | 658.4 |
Soggetto topico: | Corporate governance |
Boards of directors | |
Bank management | |
Nota di contenuto: | Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- About This Book -- Contents -- About the Author -- List of Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Table -- Chapter 1: Theories in Corporate Governance -- 1.1 Agency Theory -- 1.2 Resource Dependence Theory -- 1.3 Stakeholder Theory -- 1.4 Legitimacy Theory -- 1.5 Information Signalling Theory -- 1.6 Good Management and Slack Resource Theory -- 1.7 Behavioural Finance Theories -- References -- Chapter 2: Corporate Governance in Banking -- 2.1 The Importance of Governance in Banking -- 2.1.1 Why Islamic vs Conventional Banks? -- 2.2 Governance in Banking -- References -- Chapter 3: Setting the Stage: Board Busyness as a Matter of Modern Banking Context -- 3.1 Reputation Theory -- 3.2 Busyness Theory -- 3.3 Setting the Stage: Board Busyness as a Matter of Banking Context -- References -- Chapter 4: Dual Banking System: Conventional and Islamic Banks -- 4.1 Fundamentals of Islamic Banking Model -- 4.1.1 What Is the PLS Paradigm? -- 4.1.2 What Are Islamic Banks? -- 4.2 Practice of Shari´ah Governance Framework -- 4.2.1 What Is the Shari´ah Governance? -- 4.3 Differences Between Islamic and Conventional Banks -- 4.3.1 Business Model and Investment Modes: Risk-Transfer Model (Conventional Banks) vs Profit-Loss Sharing Paradigm (Islamic B... -- 4.3.2 Constraints on Finance Model and Prohibited Activities: Interest-Based Structure (Conventional Banks) vs Non-interest-Ba... -- 4.3.3 Agency Conflicts: More Complex Agency Conflicts of Islamic Bank than Conventional -- 4.3.4 Corporate Governance Mechanism: More Complex Corporate Governance Mechanism of Islamic than Conventional Banks -- 4.3.5 Dividend Pay-out Model: More Complex Dividend Pay-out Model of Islamic Bank than Conventional -- References -- Chapter 5: Board Busyness Hypotheses for Banks -- 5.1 Board of Directors´ Busyness in Dual Banking System. |
5.2 Shari´ah Governance Busyness in Islamic Banks -- 5.3 Empirical Evidence -- 5.3.1 Study 1: ``Board Busyness, Performance and Financial Stability: Does Bank Type Matter?´´ (2020) -- 5.3.2 Study 2: ``Differential Market Valuations of Board Busyness Across Alternative Banking Models´´ (2020) -- 5.3.3 Study 3: ``Fetching Better Deals from Creditors: Board Busyness, Agency Relationships and the Bank Cost of Debt´´ (2020) -- 5.3.4 Study 4: ``Board Busyness and New Insights into Alternative Bank Dividends Models´´ (2021) -- 5.3.5 Study 5: ``The Value Relevance of Bank Cash Holdings: The Moderating Effect of Board Busyness´´ (2021) -- 5.4 Endogeneity: A Matter in Board Busyness Research -- 5.4.1 What Is the 3SLS Compared to 2SLS? -- 5.4.2 How to Make Choice of Instrumental Variables (IVs)? -- 5.5 Statistical Problems and Remedies -- 5.5.1 Regression Diagnostic I: Multicollinearity -- 5.5.2 Regression Diagnostic II: Heteroskedasticity -- 5.5.3 Regression Diagnostic III: The Simultaneity Problem and Endogeneity -- 5.6 Measurements of Board Busyness -- References -- Chapter 6: Conclusions and New Direction on Board Busyness Research. | |
Titolo autorizzato: | Fundamentals of board busyness and corporate governance ![]() |
ISBN: | 9783030892289 |
9783030892272 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910522926003321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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