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Autore: | Coady David |
Titolo: | Targeting Social Transfers to the Poor in Mexico / / David Coady, Susan Parker |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (32 p.) |
Disciplina: | 332.152 |
Soggetto topico: | Public welfare - Mexico |
Social service - Mexico | |
Aggregate Factor Income Distribution | |
Budget planning and preparation | |
Budget Systems | |
Budget | |
Budgeting & financial management | |
Budgeting | |
Consumption | |
Demographic Economics: General | |
Demography | |
Economics | |
Education | |
Education: General | |
Household consumption | |
Income distribution | |
Income inequality | |
Income | |
Macroeconomics | |
National accounts | |
National Budget | |
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs | |
Personal income | |
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions | |
Population & demography | |
Population and demographics | |
Population | |
Public financial management (PFM) | |
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence | |
Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics: Household Analysis: General | |
Soggetto geografico: | Mexico |
Altri autori: | ParkerSusan |
Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Program and Data Description; Program Description; Tables; 1. Variables and Weights Used to Estimate the Discriminant Proxy-Means Score; Data Description; 2. Transfer Levels by Grade and Gender (pesos per month, 2002); III. Methodology; IV. Results; Figures; 1. Unconditional Probabilities; Targeting Performance Across Participation Stages; 2. Conditional Probabilities; 3. Targeting Performance by Stage; 4. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; 5. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; Policy Reform Simulations |
3. Trade-off Between Vertical Targeting Performance and Program CoverageV. Summary; Appendix; Details of Simulations Estimating Targeting Implications of Universal Knowledge; Appendix Tables; 1. Results for Conditional Application and Acceptance Outcomes and Consumption Model; 2. Application Outcomes Under Universal Knowledge; References | |
Sommario/riassunto: | Mexico’s main social support program, Oportunidades, combines two methods to target cash to poor households: an initial self-selection by households who acquire knowledge about the program and apply for benefits, followed by an administrative determination of eligibility based on a means test. Self-selection improves targeting by excluding high-income households, while administrative targeting does so mainly by excluding middle-income households. The two methods are complementary: expanding program knowledge across households substantially increases applications from non-poor households, thus reinforcing the importance of administrative targeting. The paper shows that targeting can be further improved through redesigning the means test and differentiating transfers according to demographic characteristics. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Targeting Social Transfers to the Poor in Mexico |
ISBN: | 1-4623-4468-2 |
1-4527-9245-3 | |
1-282-84281-1 | |
9786612842818 | |
1-4518-7207-0 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910810973603321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |