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The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model / / Yi Wu



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Autore: Wu Yi Visualizza persona
Titolo: The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model / / Yi Wu Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (18 p.)
Soggetto topico: Currency crises - Econometric models
Financial institutions - Econometric models
Tax collection - Econometric models
Foreign Exchange
Investments: General
Macroeconomics
Public Finance
Investment
Capital
Intangible Capital
Capacity
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Public finance & taxation
Currency
Foreign exchange
Currency crises
Depreciation
Exchange rates
Revenue administration
Expenditure
Saving and investment
Revenue
Expenditures, Public
Note generali: "January 2008."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 16).
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Figures; 1. Self-fulfilling Currency Crises; III. Institutional quality and self-fulfilling currency crises; 2a. Simulation I; 2b. Simulation II; 2c. Simulation III; IV. Concluding remarks; References
Sommario/riassunto: This paper is a theoretical study of the impact of institutional quality on currency crises from a public finance point of view. Recent empirical studies leave little doubt that weak institutions, including high levels of corruption, hinder economic performance. After the East Asian crisis, many observers have pointed to widespread corruption and crony capitalism as an underlying cause. Despite the popularity of the claim, there are only limited empirical and especially theoretical studies on the link between institutional quality and currency crises. This paper intends to fill in this void. We model institutional weakness as an inefficiency of the tax collection system. The model derived here shows that institutional weakness generally increases the likelihood of the existence of a self-fulfilling crisis equilibrium, and leads to larger currency devaluation when crises happen. However, this relationship could reverse when institutional weakness is very severe.
Titolo autorizzato: The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-3765-1
1-4527-1075-9
1-282-44816-1
9786613821355
1-4519-1320-6
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788524503321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/005