Outcomes-Based Conditionality : : Its Role and Optimal Design / / Anna Ivanova

• Autore: Ivanova Anna
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (25 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Conditionality (International relations); International finance; Banks and Banking; Taxation; Industries: Financial Services; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General; Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects; Finance; Public finance & taxation; Loans; Tax incentives; Market interest rates; Interest rates
• Note generali: "May 2006."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. OBSERVABLE CASE""; ""IV. UNOBSERVABLE CASE""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
• Sommario/riassunto: The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized.
• Titolo autorizzato: Outcomes-Based Conditionality
• ISBN: 1-4623-8007-7; 1-4527-7133-2; 1-283-51380-3; 9786613826251; 1-4519-8423-5
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910788412903321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/128