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A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies / / by Leonard Nelson



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Autore: Nelson Leonard Visualizza persona
Titolo: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies / / by Leonard Nelson Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2016
Edizione: 1st ed. 2016.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (210 p.)
Disciplina: 100
Soggetto topico: Modern philosophy
Applied linguistics
Philosophy and social sciences
Modern Philosophy
Applied Linguistics
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- The dialectical illusion in philosophy -- On coherence and truth as properties of a philosophical system -- The logistic prejudice in the philosophy of the Schoolmen and in rationalism -- Kant overcomes the rationalistic prejudice: the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments --  The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments further explored -- Significance and fruitfulness of the analytic-synthetic distinction -- Synthetic a priori judgments in geometry: the disjunction between logic and experience is incomplete -- Geometric logicism -- Geometric empiricism.
Sommario/riassunto: Presented as a Vorlesung in the German philosophical tradition, this book presents the most detailed account of Nelson’s method of argument analysis, celebrated by many luminaries such as Karl Popper. It was written in 1921 in opposition to the relativistic, subjectivistic and nihilistic tendencies of Nelson’s time. The book contains an exposition of a method that is a further development of Kant’s transcendental dialectics, followed by an application to the critical analysis of arguments by many famous thinkers, including Bentham, Mill, Poincaré, Leibniz, Hegel, Einstein, Bergson, Rickert, Simmel, Brentano, Stammler, Jellinek, Dingler, and Meinong. The book presents a general theory of philosophical argumentation as seen from the viewpoint of the typical fallacies committed by anybody arguing philosophically, whether professional philosophers or philosophical laypeople. Although the nature of philosophy and philosophical argumentation is one of the most recurrent objects of reflection for philosophers, this book represents the first attempt at a general theory of philosophical fallacy. According to Nelson, it is in the shape of false dilemmas that errors in reasoning always emerge, and false dilemmas are always the result of the same mechanism--the unwitting replacement of one concept for another.
Titolo autorizzato: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 3-319-20783-0
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910255357703321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: Argumentation Library, . 1566-7650 ; ; 26