Towards a Peaceful Development of Cyberspace : De-Escalation of State-Led Cyber Conflicts and Arms Control of Cyber Weapons

• Autore: Reinhold Thomas
• Pubblicazione: Wiesbaden : , : Springer Vieweg. in Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, , 2024; ©2024
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (378 pages)
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Abstract -- Author's Publication -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I Synopsis -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement -- 1.2 Related Work and Research Gap -- 1.3 Aim and Research Question -- 1.4 Methodology and Structure of the Thesis -- 1.5 Underlying Publications and Contributions of the Authors -- 1.5.1 Part A: Concepts and Challenges of Peace in Cyberspace -- 1.5.2 Part B: Threats From Malicious Activities in Cyberspace and Technological Trends -- 1.5.3 Part C: Approaches for the Peaceful Development of Cyberspace -- 2 Findings Part A: Concepts and Challenges of Peace in Cyberspace -- 2.1 Malicious Actors in Cyberspace -- 2.2 The Nature of Cyberwarfare -- 2.3 Arms Control and Its Challenges in Cyberspace -- 3 Findings Part B: Threats From Malicious Activities in Cyberspace and Technological Trends -- 3.1 Assessment Model for Cyberweapons -- 3.2 The Attribution Problem -- 3.3 A State's Dilemma with Vulnerabilities -- 3.4 Threats and Vulnerabilities of the Global Internet Backbone -- 3.5 How Artificial Intelligence Will Change Malicious Cyber Tools -- 4 Findings Part C: Approaches for the Peaceful Development of Cyberspace -- [DELETE] -- 4.1 De-escalating Cyberconflicts -- 4.2 Disarmament for Cyberspace by Reducing the Vulnerability Stockpiles -- 4.3 Verification in Cyberspace -- 5 Discussion and Conclusions -- 5.1 Discussion -- 5.2 Limitations -- 5.3 Future Work -- 5.4 Conclusion -- Part II Publications Part A -- 6 From Cyberwar to Cyberpeace -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Current Challenges of Cyberwar -- 6.2.1 Militarization of the Cyberspace -- 6.2.2 International Law in the Cyberspace -- 6.2.3 Lacking International Norms and Definitions -- 6.2.4 Arms Control in the Cyberspace -- 6.3 Measures for Cyberpeace -- 6.3.1 Cooperative and Declaratory Approaches. ; 6.3.2 Informatory Approaches -- 6.3.3 Technical Approaches -- 6.3.4 Cyberpeace Campaign -- 6.4 Conclusions -- 7 Military Cyber Activities in Russia's War Against Ukraine and Their Significance for the Debates on the Containment of a Cyberwar -- 7.1 Cyberwar-Expectations -- 7.2 Assessment of the Role of Military and Offensive Cyber Means of Action in Russia's War Against Ukraine -- 7.2.1 Russia's Effective Cyber Startup Phase -- 7.2.2 Inadequate Connectivity Planning for Cyberspace and International Support for Ukraine -- 7.2.3 Dangers of Uncontrolled Spread of Cyber Activities -- 7.2.4 Dependence on Local and Civilian ICT Infrastructures -- 7.2.5 Unexpected Activities of Non-state Actors -- 7.3 Conclusions -- 7.3.1 Increasing Threat to Critical Infrastructure -- 7.3.2 Increase in the Preparation of Offensive Cyber Operations -- 7.3.3 Need for Internationally Binding Norms for State Behavior in Cyberspace -- 7.3.4 Containment of the Activities of Non-state Actors and State due Diligence Obligations -- 7.3.5 Russia's Future Role in Cyberspace -- 7.4 Summary -- 8 Arms Control and its Applicability to Cyberspace -- 8.1 What is Arms Control and Why is it Necessary -- 8.1.1 Historical Examples of Arms Control -- 8.1.2 Arms Control for Nuclear Weapons Technology -- 8.1.3 Arms Control for Biological and Chemical Weapons Technology -- 8.1.4 Arms Control Treaties for Conventional Weapons and the Outer Space -- 8.1.5 Preventive Arms Control -- 8.1.6 An Overview on Existing Measures of Arms Control -- 8.2 Arms Control Measures -- 8.2.1 Confidence Building and Verification as Important Parts of Arms Control Measures -- 8.2.2 The Challenges of Arms Control Measures in Cyberspace -- 8.3 Important First Approaches of Arms Control in Cyberspace -- 8.3.1 The Wassenaar Export Control Arrangement and its Extension from 2013. ; 8.3.2 The 2018 Proposal of the EU Parliament for a Harmonised Dual-Use Export Controls Regulation -- 8.3.3 Recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts from 2015 -- 8.3.4 Proposals for Confidence Building Measures by the OSCE -- 8.3.5 State Driven Proposals for Norms and Responsibilities of State Behavior in Cyberspace -- 8.4 Summary -- 9 Challenges for Cyber Arms Control: A Qualitative Expert Interview Study -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Theoretical Perspective: Related Work -- 9.3 Methodology -- 9.3.1 Data Collection -- 9.3.2 Data Evaluation -- 9.4 Empirical Findings -- 9.4.1 A: Lack of a Definition for the Term Cyberweapon -- 9.4.2 B: Dual-Use-Dilemma -- 9.4.3 C: Verification -- 9.4.4 D: Constant Technological Development and Role of the Private Sector -- 9.4.5 E: Political Will -- 9.4.6 Further Remarks from the Interviews -- 9.5 Discussion -- 9.5.1 Discussion of the Results -- 9.5.2 Interpretation -- 9.5.3 Limitations and Future Work -- 9.6 Conclusion -- 9.7 Annex -- 9.7.1 Overview of the Challenges to Establishing an Arms Control Agreement in Cyberspace -- 9.7.2 Interview Guidelines -- 9.7.3 Coding Scheme -- Part III Publications Part B -- 10 Towards a Cyberweapons Assessment Model-Assessment of the Technical Features of Malicious Software -- 10.1 Introduction and Research Question -- 10.1.1 Research Question and Methodology -- 10.2 Related Work: Current Approaches for the Classification of Cyber Weapons -- 10.2.1 Intent- and Effect-Based Classification -- 10.2.2 Classifications Based on the Strategic Assessments -- 10.2.3 Classifications Based on Normative Aspects -- 10.2.4 Classifications Based on the Comparison with Traditional Weapons and Weapons Technology -- 10.2.5 Classifications Based on Architectural Characteristics of Malicious Software -- 10.2.6 Research Gap -- 10.3 Technical Features of Cyber Weapons. ; 10.3.1 Production and Storage -- 10.3.2 Availability and Steps for Full Operational Capability -- 10.3.3 Deployment and Operation -- 10.3.4 Direct Impact and Effects -- 10.3.5 Overall Results, Successions and Leverage -- 10.4 Assessment Model for Cyberweapons and Case-Study-based Evaluation -- 10.4.1 How to Assess Cyber Weapons -- 10.4.2 Case-Study based Evaluation -- 10.4.3 First Positive Case: Stuxnet -- 10.4.4 Second Positive Case: TRISIS/TRITON -- 10.4.5 Negative Case: Emotet -- 10.4.6 Evaluation of Results -- 10.5 Conclusion and Future Work -- 10.5.1 The Technical Assessment of Cyber Weapons -- 10.5.2 Limitations -- 10.5.3 Further Research -- 10.6 Annex -- 10.6.1 Stuxnet -- 10.6.2 TRISIS/TRITON -- 10.6.3 Emotet -- 11 Spotting the Bear: Credible Attribution and Russian Operations in Cyberspace -- 11.1 Attribution: What It Is and What for? -- 11.2 Attributing a Cyber Operation -- 11.2.1 Technical Aspects of Attribution -- 11.2.2 Intelligence Aspect of Attribution -- 11.2.3 Geopolitics of Attribution -- 11.3 Why It Is Problematic to Point to Russia -- 12 Wannacry About the Tragedy of the Commons? Game-theory and the Failure of Global Vulnerability Disclosure -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Cooperation Under Anarchy -- 12.2.1 Prisoners Dilemma and Zero Days -- 12.2.2 Escaping the Dilemma -- 12.3 Cooperating on Vulnerability Disclosure -- 12.3.1 Particularities of Cyberspace and Digital Goods -- 12.3.2 The WannaCry and NotPetya Malware Campaigns and its EternalBlue Roots -- 12.4 Suggestions to Foster the Cooperation in Cyberspace -- 12.5 Conclusion -- 13 The Digital Divide in State Vulnerability to Submarine Communications Cable Failure -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Related Work and Research Gap -- 13.3 Method -- 13.3.1 Definitions -- 13.3.2 Network Analysis -- 13.3.3 Scenarios and Group Formation -- 13.3.4 Availability of Data Sets. ; 13.3.5 Data Compilation -- 13.3.6 Statistical Analysis Program -- 13.4 Findings -- 13.4.1 Identification of Central Nodes through Centrality Indices -- 13.4.2 Assessing State Vulnerability to SCC Loss through Fault Scenarios -- 13.4.3 Socio-Economic Development and Redundancy Levels -- 13.4.4 Summary of the Findings -- 13.5 Discussion -- 13.6 Conclusion -- 14 Cyberweapons and Artificial Intelligence-Impact, Influence and the Challenges for Arms Control -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Cyberweapons and the Militarization of Cyberspace -- 14.2.1 The Current Situation of State-Driven Cyberattacks -- 14.3 How the Technology of Cyberweapons and Its Application Will Evolve -- 14.4 How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Could Influence Cyberweapons -- 14.4.1 Explainability and Responsibility of AI-Enabled Cyberweapons -- 14.4.2 AI and the Pitfalls of the Attribution of Cyberattacks -- 14.5 The Negative Impact on Arms Control of Artificial Intelligence in Cyberweapons -- 14.6 How Can Artificial Intelligence Support Cyber Arms Control? -- 14.7 Conclusion -- Part IV Publications Part C -- 15 Preventing the Escalation of Cyberconflicts: Towards an Approach to Plausibly Assure the Non-Involvement in a Cyberattack -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Related Work -- 15.2.1 Technical Challenges -- 15.2.2 Political and Security Challenges -- 15.3 Case Examples -- 15.3.1 Selected Case Examples -- 15.3.2 Comparison of the Example Cases -- 15.4 Technical Properties of the Cyberspace and the Ambiguity of Digital Data -- 15.5 Reducing the Escalation Risk: Outline of a System to Plausibly Assure Non-involvement in a Cyberattack -- 15.5.1 Political Incentives and Motivation of States to Establish and Comply with such a Measure -- 15.5.2 Requirements for a System for the Plausible Assurance of Non-involvement. ; 15.5.3 A Conceptual Cyber Incident Model as a Potential Use Case Scenario.
• Titolo autorizzato: Towards a Peaceful Development of Cyberspace
• ISBN: 3-658-43951-3
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910847081903321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Technology, Peace and Security I Technologie, Frieden und Sicherheit Series