Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation / / Fabian Valencia, Kenichi Ueda
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| Autore: |
Valencia Fabian
|
| Titolo: |
Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation / / Fabian Valencia, Kenichi Ueda
|
| Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012 |
| Edizione: | 1st ed. |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (28 p.) |
| Disciplina: | 332.1/52 |
| Soggetto topico: | Banks and banking, Central |
| Banks and banking | |
| Banks and Banking | |
| Finance: General | |
| Inflation | |
| Macroeconomics | |
| Money and Monetary Policy | |
| Optimization Techniques | |
| Programming Models | |
| Dynamic Analysis | |
| Macroeconomics: Consumption | |
| Saving | |
| Wealth | |
| Contingent Pricing | |
| Futures Pricing | |
| option pricing | |
| Price Level | |
| Deflation | |
| Banks | |
| Depository Institutions | |
| Micro Finance Institutions | |
| Mortgages | |
| General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation | |
| Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General | |
| Banking | |
| Finance | |
| Monetary economics | |
| Price stabilization | |
| Financial sector stability | |
| Credit | |
| Prices | |
| Government policy | |
| Financial services industry | |
| Altri autori: |
UedaKenichi
|
| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation |
| Sommario/riassunto: | We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation |
| ISBN: | 1-4755-1163-9 |
| 1-4755-8117-3 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910818620303321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |
Serie:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2012/101