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Kant and Skepticism [[electronic resource] /] / Michael N. Forster



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Autore: Forster Michael N Visualizza persona
Titolo: Kant and Skepticism [[electronic resource] /] / Michael N. Forster Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, : Princeton University Press, 2010
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (163 p.)
Disciplina: 149/.7309
Soggetto topico: Skepticism
Note generali: Originally published 2008.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- I. Exposition -- Chapter One. Varieties Of Skepticism -- Chapter Two. "Veil of Perception" Skepticism -- Chapter Three. Skepticism and Metaphysics (A Puzzle) -- Chapter Four. Kant's Pyrrhonian Crisis -- Chapter Five. Humean Skepticism -- Chapter Six. Kant's Reformed Metaphysics -- Chapter Seven. Defenses against Humean Skepticism -- Chapter Eight. Defenses Against Pyrrhonian Skepticism -- II. Critical Assessment -- Chapter Nine. Some Relatively Easy Problems -- Chapter Ten. A Metaphysics of Morals? -- Chapter Eleven. Failures of Self-Reflection -- Chapter Twelve. The Pyrrhonist's Revenge -- Notes -- Index
Sommario/riassunto: This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional views by showing how the first of these types was of little importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against these types of skepticism. Finally, in a critical appraisal of Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Titolo autorizzato: Kant and Skepticism  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-283-06953-9
9786613069535
1-4008-2440-0
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910816617103321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: Princeton monographs in philosophy.