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The constrained court [[electronic resource] ] : law, politics, and the decisions justices make / / Michael A. Bailey, Forrest Maltzman



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Autore: Bailey Michael A. <1969-> Visualizza persona
Titolo: The constrained court [[electronic resource] ] : law, politics, and the decisions justices make / / Michael A. Bailey, Forrest Maltzman Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, : Princeton University Press, 2011
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (216 p.)
Disciplina: 347.73/26
Soggetto topico: Political questions and judicial power - United States
Soggetto non controllato: American law
Court behavior
Court voting
Richard Nixon
Supreme Court justices
U.S. Congress
U.S. president
attitudinal model
constitution
constitutional cases
constitutional order
decision making
deference
elected branches
executive branch
executive influence
historical context
judicial decision-making
judicial decisions
judicial preferences
judicial restraint
judiciary
law
legal constraints
legal doctrine
legal doctrines
legal values
personal experiences
personal policy preference
policy preference
policy preferences
political system
politics
precedent
precedents
president
solicitor general
stare decisis
statutory cases
Altri autori: MaltzmanForrest <1963->  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Measure of Law: Estimating Preferences across Institutions and Time -- Part I. Legal Value Constraints -- 3. Disentangling Law and Policy Preferences -- 4. Law Matters -- 5. Causes and Consequences of Diverse Legal Values -- Part II. Political Constraints -- 6. Separation of Powers and the Strategic Constraint -- 7. Signals from the Executive -- 8. Conclusion -- Appendix. Statistical Details -- Notes -- References -- Index
Sommario/riassunto: How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? The Constrained Court combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman show how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, Bailey and Maltzman document that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The authors find considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, Bailey and Maltzman show that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. The Constrained Court shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.
Titolo autorizzato: The constrained court  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-283-16903-7
9786613169037
1-4008-4026-0
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910781460603321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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