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Banking Crises and Crisis Dating : : Theory and Evidence / / Elena Loukoianova, Gianni De Nicolo, John Boyd



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Autore: Loukoianova Elena Visualizza persona
Titolo: Banking Crises and Crisis Dating : : Theory and Evidence / / Elena Loukoianova, Gianni De Nicolo, John Boyd Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (52 p.)
Disciplina: 332
Soggetto topico: Bank failures - Econometric models
Banks and banking - Econometric models
Economic indicators
Banks and Banking
Financial Risk Management
Macroeconomics
Money and Monetary Policy
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Financial Crises
Foreign Exchange
Banking
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Monetary economics
Deposit insurance
Bank credit
Banking crises
Currency crises
Banks and banking
Crisis management
Credit
Financial crises
Soggetto geografico: United States
Altri autori: De NicoloGianni  
BoydJohn  
Note generali: "July 2009."
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction and Summary; II. Major Classifications of Banking Crises; III. BC Indicators an d Their Discrepancies; IV. A Simple Banking Model; V. Evidence from Cross-Country Data: Benchmark Specifications; A. Logit Regressions with BC Indicators as Dependent Variables; B. SBS indicators Predict BC indicators; C. Logit Regressions with SBS Indicators as Dependent Variables; VI. Market Structure and Deposit Insurance; A. Bank Market Structure and Competition; B. Deposit Insurance; VII. Currency and "Twin" Crises; A. BC and SBS Indicators as Dependent Variables
B. Currency Crises as Dependent VariablesVIII. Evidence from Bank-Level Data; A. Measures of Systemic Bank Shocks; B. SBS indicators Predict BC indicators; C. Market Structure, Deposit Insurance and External Shocks; VI. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. BC Indicators; 2. Logit Regressions with Start Date BC Indicators (crisis dates after the first crisis year excluded); 3. Logit Regressions with BC Indicators (all observations with crisis dating); 4. Logit Regressions: Do SBS Lending Indicators Predict BC Indicators?; 5. Logit Regressions: Do SBS Deposit Indicators Predict BC Indicators?
6. Logit Regressions with SBS Indicators ad Dependent Variables7. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators and Bank Concentration Measures; 8. Logit Regressions: SBS Indicators and Bank Concentration Measures; 9. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators and Deposit Insurance; 10. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators, Deposit Insurance Features and Quality of Institutions; 11. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, Currency and Twin Crises; 12. Logit Regressions: SBS Indicators, Currency and Twin Crises; 13. Logit Regressions: Currency Crises and SBS Indicators
14. Bank Level Data, Random Effect Logit Regressions: SBS Indicators Predict BC Indicators15. Bank Level Data, Random Effect Logit Regressions: Determinants of SBS and BC Indicators; A1. ""Systemic"" Banking Crises and Crisis Dating in Different Classifications
Sommario/riassunto: Many empirical studies of banking crises have employed "banking crisis" (BC) indicators constructedusing primarily information on government actions undertaken in response to bank distress. Weformulate a simple theoretical model of a banking industry which we use to identify and constructtheory-based measures of systemic bank shocks (SBS). Using both country-level and firm-level samples, we show that SBS indicators consistently predict BC indicators based on four major BCseries that have appeared in the literature. Therefore, BC indicatorsactually measure lagged government responses to systemic bank shocks, rather than the occurrence of crises per se. We re-examine the separate impact of macroeconomic factors, bank market structure, deposit insurance, andexternal shocks on the probability of a systemic bank shocks and on the probability of governmentresponses to bank distress. The impact of these variables on the likelihood of a government responseto bank distress is totally different from that on the likelihood of a systemic bank shock.Disentangling the effects of systemic bank shocks and government responses turns out to be crucial inunderstanding the roots of bank fragility. Many findings of a large empirical literature need to be re-assessed and/or re-interpreted.
Titolo autorizzato: Banking Crises and Crisis Dating  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-9007-2
1-4527-2282-X
9786612843556
1-4518-7288-7
1-282-84355-9
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910828973003321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/141