Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : : A General Equilibrium Exposition / / Gianni De Nicolo, Marcella Lucchetta
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| Autore: |
De Nicolo Gianni
|
| Titolo: |
Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : : A General Equilibrium Exposition / / Gianni De Nicolo, Marcella Lucchetta
|
| Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
| Edizione: | 1st ed. |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (31 p.) |
| Disciplina: | 332.152 |
| Soggetto topico: | Intermediation (Finance) |
| Competition | |
| Banks and Banking | |
| Econometrics | |
| Finance: General | |
| Labor | |
| Banks | |
| Depository Institutions | |
| Micro Finance Institutions | |
| Mortgages | |
| General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation | |
| Labor Demand | |
| General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) | |
| Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models | |
| Banking | |
| Finance | |
| Labour | |
| income economics | |
| Econometrics & economic statistics | |
| Moral hazard | |
| Self-employment | |
| General equilibrium models | |
| Banks and banking | |
| Financial risk management | |
| Self-employed | |
| Econometric models | |
| Altri autori: |
LucchettaMarcella
|
| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References |
| Sommario/riassunto: | We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk |
| ISBN: | 1-4623-6889-1 |
| 1-4527-8538-4 | |
| 1-4518-7252-6 | |
| 9786612843204 | |
| 1-282-84320-6 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910827478003321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |
Serie:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/105