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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA996601563403316"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Smith Benjamin"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Selected Areas in Cryptography : 29th International Conference, SAC 2022, Windsor, on, Canada, August 24-26, 2022, Revised Selected Papers"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cham : , : Springer International Publishing AG, , 2024"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2024"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"3-031-58411-2"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (485 pages)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; ; v.13742"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Invited Talks -- On the Passive Compromise of TLS Keys and Other Cryptanalytic Adventures -- Hard Problems for Isogeny-Based Cryptography -- Efficient Key Recovery Attacks on SIDH -- Contents -- Lattices and ECC -- Profiling Side-Channel Attacks on Dilithium -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Notation -- 2.2 Dilithium Description -- 2.3 Machine-Learning Model for Profiling Side-Channel Analysis -- 3 Overview of the Attack -- 4 Power Side-Channel Leakage in Dilithium -- 4.1 The Leaking polyz_unpack Function -- 4.2 Training Models to Learn Coefficients from Power Traces -- 5 Secret Key Retrieval -- 5.1 Step 1: Predicting Which Error Polynomial Coefficients Are Zero -- 5.2 Step 2: Mapping the Predictions into a Set of Linear Equations -- 5.3 Step 3: Obtaining a Solution Candidate from a Set of Linear Equations -- 5.4 Step 4: Solving an Integer Linear Program Leveraging the Solution Candidate -- 5.5 Alternative Attack Strategies -- 6 Experimental Setup and Results -- 7 Conclusion and Possible Countermeasures -- A  Lattices -- B  Learning With Errors -- C  Dilithium -- D  Universal Forgery -- E  Machine-Learning Assisted Profiling Attacks -- F  T-Test for Leakage Detection -- G  Experimental Setup -- References -- On the Weakness of Ring-LWE mod Prime Ideal q by Trace Map -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminary -- 2.1 Algebra and Statistical Background -- 2.2 Ring-LWE Problem Problem -- 2.3 Attacks for Ring-LWE(mod q) -- 3 Attacks on Ring-LWE(mod q) by Trace Map -- 3.1 The Prime-Residue-Degree 2-Attack -- 3.2 The Composite-Number-Residue-Degree 2-Attack -- 3.3 Vulnerable Field -- 4 Comparison with the 2-Attack -- 5 Conclusion -- "]
[{"$nulls":4},"References -- 2DT-GLS: Faster and Exception-Free Scalar Multiplication in the GLS254 Binary Curve -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Binary GLS Curves."]
[{"$nulls":4},"2.2 -Projective Coordinates for GLS Scalar Multiplication -- 2.3 GLS254 and the Choice of Parameters -- 3 Scalar Multiplication in GLS Curves -- 3.1 The 2DT Variant -- 3.2 Proof of Exception-Free Scalar Multiplication -- 4 Scalar Decomposition with Parity and Length Guarantees -- 5 New Formulas for Faster Precomputation -- 6 Binary Field Arithmetic for Arm -- 6.1 Arithmetic in the Base Field Fq -- 6.2 Arithmetic in the Extension Field Fq2 -- 7 Results and Discussion -- 7.1 Operation Counts for Binary GLS Scalar Multiplication -- 7.2 Implementation Timings -- References -- Differential Cryptanalysis -- Key-Recovery Attacks on CRAFT and WARP -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contributions -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Specification of CRAFT -- 2.2 Description of WARP -- 2.3 Differential Attacks with High-Probability Characteristics -- 3 Practical Related-Key Differential Attack on CRAFT -- 3.1 Related-(Twea)Key Differential Properties of CRAFT -- 3.2 Practical Key-Recovery Attack on CRAFT -- 4 Related-Key Differential Attack on WARP -- 4.1 Related-Key Differential Property of WARP -- 4.2 Key-Recovery Attack on WARP -- 5 Multiple Zero-Correlation Linear Attack on WARP -- 5.1 21-Round Zero-Correlation Linear Approximations -- 5.2 33-Round Multiple Zero-Correlation Linear Attack on WARP -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Differential Analysis of the Ternary Hash Function Troika -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Differential Cryptanalysis -- 3 Troika Description -- 4 General Strategy for Differential Trail Search ch5Keccak2017 -- 4.1 Overview of the Steps -- 4.2 Generating 2-Round Trail Cores as a Tree Traversal -- 5 Generating 2-Round Trail Cores in Troika -- 5.1 Generating |K|-Trail Cores -- 5.2 Reducing the Problem of Generating |N|-Trail Cores to that of Generating Parity-Bare States at the Input of -- 5.3 Generating Parity-Bare States at the Input of."]
[{"$nulls":4},"6 Dealing with |K|K| Profile and Extensions -- 7 Results and Conclusion -- A Appendix -- References -- Another Look at Differential-Linear Attacks -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis -- 1.2 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis -- 1.3 Our Contributions -- 2 Notations -- 3 Partitioning, Neutral Bits, and Combination of Them -- 3.1 DL Cryptanalysis with Partitioning -- 3.2 Neutral Bits -- 3.3 A Comparison Between Partitioning and Neutral Bits -- 3.4 Combining Partitioning and Neutral Bits -- 4 New DL Attacks on Round-Reduced Xoodyak -- 4.1 4-Round DL Attack on Xoodyak -- 4.2 5-Round Related-Key DL Attack on Xoodyak -- 5 Improved DL Attacks on Round-Reduced DES -- 5.1 Description of Biham et al.'s Attacks ch6BihamDK02 -- 5.2 Our Improved Attacks on Round-Reduced DES -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Cryptographic Primitives -- Injective Rank Metric Trapdoor Functions with Homogeneous Errors -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminary Definitions -- 2.1 Notation -- 2.2 Rank Metric -- 2.3 Statistical Indistinguishability and Pseudo-Randomness -- 2.4 Universal Hashing -- 2.5 Injective Trapdoor Function -- 3 Intractability Assumptions -- 4 A Decoding Algorithm for Homogeneous Errors -- 5 Injective Trapdoor Functions -- 6 Parameters -- 7 Conclusion -- A Auxiliary Result -- B Upper-Bound on the Decoding Failure Probability -- References -- PERKS: Persistent and Distributed Key Acquisition for Secure Storage from Passwords -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Problem Statement -- 1.2 Contributions -- 1.3 Related Primitives and Existing Literature -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notation and Security Games -- 2.2 Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions: Syntax -- 2.3 Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions: Security Notions -- 3 DKA and Security Models -- 3.1 Distributed Key "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Acquisition -- 3.2 A Unified Security Notion for DKA -- 4 Constructions -- 4.1 Generic Construction."]
[{"$nulls":4},"4.2 n out of n setting -- 4.3 t out of n setting -- 4.4 Security Proofs -- 5 Key Rotation in PERKS -- A  WhatsApp Encrypted Backup Rollout -- B  Using PERKS as a Storage System -- C  Secret Sharing Schemes -- D  OPRF Definition Relations -- E  Security Proofs -- F  OPRFs and Their Variants -- F.1 OPRF Literature -- G  Use of Existing OPRFs in PERKS -- References -- Improved Circuit-Based PSI via Equality Preserving Compression -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contribution -- 1.2 Related Works -- 1.3 Roadmap -- 2 Preliminary -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Oblivious Transfers -- 2.3 RLWE-Based Homomorphic Encryption -- 3 Circuit-Based PSI -- 3.1 OPPRF-Based Circuit-PSI Framework -- 4 Equality Preserving Compression -- 4.1 A Basic Protocol -- 4.2 Optimizations and Full Protocol -- 4.3 Security and Cost Analysis -- 5 Application to Circuit-PSI Framework -- 6 Performance Evaluation -- 6.1 Parameter Selections -- 6.2 Choice of c with ESG -- 6.3 Impact on Circuit-PSI -- A  HE and EPC Parameters -- References -- Isogeny-based Cryptography I -- Revisiting Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of SIDH/SIKE with Application to the IKEp182 Challenge -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Approach -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Isogenies Between Supersingular Elliptic Curves -- 2.2 SIDH and SIKE -- 2.3 Efficient Isogeny Computation -- 3 Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on SIKE -- 4 Efficient Tree Generation -- 4.1 Maintaining Torsion Basis for Efficient Isogeny Computations -- 4.2 Optimal Strategies for the Doubling/Isogeny Evaluation Trade-Off -- 5 Set Intersection Using Sort and Merge -- 5.1 Hash-Tables or Sort and Merge? -- 5.2 Storage-Collisions Trade-Off and Compression -- 6 Cryptanalysis of the IKEp182 Challenge -- 7 Discussion on Scalability -- References -- Patient Zero &amp -- Patient Six: Zero-Value and Correlation Attacks on CSIDH and SIKE -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries."]
[{"$nulls":4},"2.1 CSIDH -- 2.2 SIKE -- 3 Recovering CSIDH Keys with E0 Side-Channel Leakage -- 3.1 Discovering a Bit of Information on a Secret Isogeny Walk -- 3.2 Recovering Secret Keys in SQALE -- 3.3 Recovering Secret Keys in CTIDH -- 4 Recovering SIKE Keys with Side-Channel Leakage of E6 -- 5 Feasibility of Obtaining the Side-Channel Information -- 6 Simulating the Attacks on SQALE, CTIDH and SIKE -- 7 Countermeasures and Conclusion -- 7.1 Public Key Validation -- 7.2 Avoiding E0 or E6 -- 7.3 Avoiding Correlations -- References -- An Effective Lower Bound on the Number of Orientable Supersingular Elliptic Curves -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Mathematical Background -- 2.1 Quaternion Orders -- 2.2 Quadratic Orders and Oriented Supersingular Elliptic Curves -- 3 The Number of O-Orientable Supersingular Curves -- 3.1 A First Result for Small Discriminants -- 3.2 The Case of OK. -- 4 A Numerical Application to the Parameters of SETA -- 5 Conclusion and Open Problems -- References -- Block Ciphers -- Finding All Impossible Differentials When Considering the DDT -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations and Definitions -- 2.2 Current MILP Model for Detecting IDs -- 3 Finding All Impossible Differentials -- 3.1 Partition: A Theoretical Viewpoint -- 3.2 Partition: A Practical Viewpoint -- 3.3 Solving MILP Models for E1 -- 3.4 Identify All IDs in Remaining -- 4 Applications to AES-Like SPN Ciphers -- 5 Applications to SbPN Cipher GIFT-64 -- 6 Towards Large-Size Ciphers -- 7 Conclusion and Future Work -- References -- A Three-Stage MITM Attack on LowMC from a Single Plaintext-Ciphertext Pair -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notation -- 2.2 Description of LowMC -- 3 Revisiting Banik, Barooti, Vaudenay and Yan's Attack -- 4 Discussion About Linear Independence of Kr1, Kr2 and Kr3 -- 5 Improved Attacks on LowMC Instances with Partial SBoxes Layers."]
[{"$nulls":4},"5.1 The Three-Stage MITM Attack Framework."]