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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA996594167603316"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Joye Marc"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2024 : 43rd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Zurich, Switzerland, May 26-30, 2024, Proceedings, Part I"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cham : , : Springer International Publishing AG, , 2024"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2024"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"3-031-58716-2"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (505 pages)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; ; v.14651"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents - Part I -- Awarded Papers -- SQIsignHD: New Dimensions in Cryptography -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 A Modular Overview of SQIsignHD -- 2 Representing the Response Isogeny Efficiently in Higher Dimension -- 2.1 State of the Art Isogeny Representation: A Slow Signature Process -- 2.2 Embedding Isogenies in Higher Dimension with Kani's Lemma -- 2.3 Application of Kani's Lemma to SQIsign -- 3 Key Generation, Commitment and Challenge -- 3.1 Accessible Torsion and Choice of the Prime Characteristic -- 3.2 Challenge Generation -- 3.3 Fast Key Generation and Commitment -- 4 Response and Verification -- 4.1 Overview of the Response Computation -- 4.2 Finding a Uniformly Random Tight Response Ideal -- 4.3 Dividing the Higher Dimensional Isogeny Computation in Two -- 4.4 Computing the Response Isogeny Representation -- 4.5 Verification -- 5 Security Analysis -- 5.1 Knowledge Soundness -- 5.2 Heuristic Zero-Knowledge Property -- 5.3 On Hardness of the Supersingular Endomorphism Problem with Access to an Auxiliary Oracle -- 6 The SQIsignHD Digital Signature Scheme -- 6.1 Compactness -- 6.2 Time Efficiency -- References -- Tight Indistinguishability Bounds for the XOR of Independent Random Permutations by Fourier Analysis -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The XoP Construction -- 1.2 Our Contribution -- 1.3 Paper Structure -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Probability -- 2.2 Fourier Analysis -- 2.3 Cryptographic Preliminaries and Sampling Without Replacement -- 3 Indistinguishability Bounds for XoP[r,n] Using Fourier Properties of Sampling Without Replacement -- 3.1 Basic Properties of n,k -- 3.2 "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Application to Indistinguishability Bounds for XoP[r,n] -- 4 Bounding M=k[n,k] (Proof of Lemma 1) -- 4.1 Bounding |n,k\"0362n,k()| for  of Type K = (k) -- 4.2 Classification of Masks -- 4.3 Bounding |n,k\"0362n,k()| for General."]
[{"$nulls":4},"5 Bounding W=k[n,k] (Proof of Lemma 2) -- A  Missing Proofs from Section4 -- References -- AprèsSQI: Extra Fast Verification for SQIsign Using Extension-Field Signing -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Elliptic Curves and Their Endomorphism Rings -- 2.2 Quaternion Algebras and the Deuring Correspondence -- 2.3 SQIsign -- 2.4 SQIsign-Friendly Primes -- 2.5 Computing Rational Isogenies from Irrational Generators -- 3 Signing with Extension Fields -- 3.1 Changes in the Signing Procedure -- 3.2 Increased Torsion Availability from Extension Fields -- 3.3 Cost of Signing Using Extension Fields -- 4 Effect of Increased 2-Torsion on Verification -- 4.1 Detailed Description of Verification -- 4.2 Impact of Large f on Verification -- 4.3 Implementation and Benchmark of Cost in Fp-Multiplications -- 5 Optimisations for Verification -- 5.1 Basis Generation for Full 2-Power Torsion -- 5.2 General Improvements to Verification -- 5.3 To Push, or Not to Push-that is, the Q. -- 5.4 Improved Challenge for f -- 6 Size-Speed Trade-Offs in SQIsign Signatures -- 6.1 Adding Seeds for the Torsion Basis in the Signature -- 6.2 Uncompressed Signatures -- 7 Primes and Performance -- 7.1 Performance of Optimised Verification -- 7.2 Finding Specific Primes -- 7.3 Performance for Specific Primes -- References -- Symmetric Cryptology -- The Exact Multi-user Security of (Tweakable) Key Alternating Ciphers with a Single Permutation -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Research Question -- 1.2 Contributions -- 1.3 Organization -- 2 Basic Notation -- 3 KACs: Specification and Security Definition -- 3.1 KACs with a Single Permutation -- 3.2 Definition of Mu-SPRP Security of KACs -- 4 Mu-Security of KACs with a Single Permutation -- 4.1 r-Wise Independent Subkeys -- 4.2 Mu-SPRP Security Bounds of KACs -- 4.3 Tools for the Mu-SPRP Security Proof."]
[{"$nulls":4},"4.4 Re-Sampling Method for Triple Encryption ch4tdesspsccs2022 -- 4.5 Updating the Re-Sampling Method for Arbitrary Round KACs -- 4.6 Evaluation for Good Transcript -- 5 Proof of Theorem 1 -- 5.1 Notations and Definitions -- 5.2 Definition of Chain -- 5.3 Dummy Internal Values in the Ideal World -- 5.4 Adversary's View -- 5.5 Bad Events and Definitions of Good and Bad Transcripts -- 5.6 Deriving the Upper-Bound in Theorem 1 -- 5.7 Upper-Bounding Pr[TI Tbad] -- 5.8 Lower-Bounding Pr[TR=]Pr[TI=] -- 5.9 Proof of Lemma 2 -- 5.10 Proof of Lemma 3 -- 6 The Exact Mu-Security of Tweakable KACs -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Partial Sums Meet FFT: Improved Attack on 6-Round AES -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Description of AES -- 2.2 The Square Attack on AES -- 2.3 The Partial Sums Attack -- 2.4 The FFT-Based Attack of Todo and Aoki -- 3 The New Technique: Partial Sums Meet FFT -- 3.1 The Basic Technique -- 3.2 Packing Several FFTs Together by Embedding into Z -- 3.3 Enhancements and Other Variants of the Basic Technique -- 3.4 Our Technique vs. Partial Sums and the Todo-Aoki Technique -- 3.5 Experimental Verification of Our Attack on 6-Round AES -- 4 Improved Attack on Kuznyechik -- 4.1 The Structure of Kuznyechik -- 4.2 The Multiset-Algebraic Attack of Biryukov et al. -- 4.3 Improvement Using Our Technique -- 5 Summary -- References -- New Records in Collision Attacks on SHA-2 -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Description of SHA-2 -- 2.3 Previous Methods to Search for Differential Characteristics -- 3 SAT/SMT-Based Tools for the MD-SHA Hash Family -- 3.1 SAT/SMT Models for the Signed Difference Transitions -- 3.2 SAT/SMT Models for the Value Transitions "]
[{"$nulls":4},"-- 3.3 Models for SHA-2 -- 4 New (SFS/FS) Collision Attacks on SHA-2 -- 4.1 The First Practical SFS Collision for 39-Step SHA-256."]
[{"$nulls":4},"4.2 Improved Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-256 -- 4.3 The First Collision Attack on 31-Step SHA-512 -- 4.4 The Practical Collision Attack on 28-Step SHA-512 -- 4.5 The First Practical FS Collision for 40-Step SHA-224 -- 5 Summary and Future Work -- References -- Improving Linear Key Recovery Attacks Using Walsh Spectrum Puncturing -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Binary Vector Spaces -- 2.2 Pseudoboolean Functions and Their Walsh Spectra -- 2.3 Vectorial Boolean Functions -- 2.4 Linear Appproximations -- 2.5 Key Recovery Linear Attack Scenario -- 2.6 Distribution of the Experimental Correlation -- 3 Approximating the Key Recovery Map -- 3.1 Effect on the Data Complexity -- 3.2 Walsh Spectrum Puncturing -- 3.3 Experimental Verification -- 3.4 Relationship to Multiple and Multidimensional Attacks -- 4 Puncturing Walsh Spectra -- 4.1 Some Useful Results -- 4.2 Puncturing Strategies -- 5 Application to Serpent -- 5.1 Improved Key Recovery Attack Against 12-Round Serpent-256 -- 5.2 Improved Key Recovery Attack Against 12-Round Serpent-192 -- 6 Application to GIFT-128 -- 6.1 Application to GIFT-128 in the General Setting -- 6.2 Application to GIFT-128 on the COFB Setting -- 7 Application to the Data Encryption Standard -- 8 Application to Noekeon -- 9 Conclusion -- References -- A Generic Algorithm for Efficient Key Recovery in Differential Attacks - and its Associated Tool -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Key Recovery Problem in Differential Cryptanalysis -- 2.1 Differential Cryptanalysis -- 2.2 Efficient Key Recovery -- 2.3 Considered Ciphers -- 3 Modeling the Key Recovery Problem -- 3.1 Our Modelization -- 3.2 Sieving of the Pairs Using the Differential Constraints of the S-Boxes -- 3.3 Precomputing Partial Solutions -- 3.4 Computing in Parallel -- 4 Algorithm and Its Associated Tool -- 4.1 High-Level Description of Our Algorithm."]
[{"$nulls":4},"4.2 Taking into Account the Techniques of Section3 -- 4.3 Parameters and Limitations -- 5 Applications -- 5.1 Validity and Experiments -- 5.2 RECTANGLE -- 5.3 PRESENT -- 5.4 GIFT-64 -- 5.5 Application to SPEEDY-7-192 -- 6 Conclusion and Open Problems -- References -- Tight Security of TNT and Beyond -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Motivation -- 1.2 Contributions -- 1.3 Impact of Our Birthday-Bound Attack -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 (Tweakable) Block Ciphers and Random Permutations -- 2.2 Security Definition -- 2.3 The Expectation Method -- 3 Birthday-Bound Attack on -- 3.1 Comparing the Number of Collision Pairs in  -.4\"0365-.4,m  and  ,m -- 3.2 The Collision Counting Distinguisher -- 3.3 Experimental Verification -- 4 Spotting the Flaw in the BBB Security Proof of -- 5 Birthday-Bound Security of and Its Variant -- 6 The Generalized LRW Paradigm -- 6.1 Security of LRW+ -- 6.2 Instantiating LRW+ -- 7 Conclusion and Future Directions -- References -- Improved Differential Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries: Differential Meet-in-the-Middle -- 2.1 Framework of the Differential MITM Attack -- 2.2 Improvement: Parallel Partitions for Layers with Partial Subkeys -- 2.3 Reducing Data Needed with Imposed Conditions -- 3 Truncated Differential Meet-in-the-Middle Attack -- 3.1 Framework of the Truncated Differential MITM Attack -- 3.2 Attack Complexities -- 4 New Improvements to Differential MITM Attacks -- 4.1 Improving the Parallel Partitioning -- 4.2 Probabilistic Key Recovery Technique -- 4.3 Applying the State-Test Technique -- 5 MILP Modeling of the Truncated Differential-MITM Attack -- 5.1 MILP Model of the Basic Attack -- 5.2 MILP Model of the Improved Attack -- 6 Application on 23-Round CRAFT -- 6.1 An Attack on 23 Rounds of CRAFT -- 6.2 Other Attacks on CRAFT and Conclusion -- 7 Applications: SKINNY-64-"]
[{"$nulls":4},"192 and SKINNY-128-384."]
[{"$nulls":4},"7.1 Attack on 23-Round SKINNY-64-192."]