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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA996267845703316"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"CALIENDO, Gennaro"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Manuale pratico sulle accise : Imposte sulla produzione e sui consumi : Aggiornato alla luce delle disposizioni dettate dalla legge 27712/2017 n. 205. Comprende il \"Testo unico delle Accise\" aggiornato al 1° gennaio 2018 / Gennaro Caliendo, Roberto Quercia"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Torino : Giappichelli, c2018"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"978-88-7524-405-7"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"X, 417 p. ; 24 cm"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"343.450553"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Accise - Legislazione - Italia"]
[null,null,"Collocazione",null,"XXIV.5.C. 1249"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Italiano"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910464234303321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Pani Marco"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Hold your nose and vote [[electronic resource] ] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"[Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-3559-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-5814-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612843037"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-7230-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84303-6"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (34 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/83"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Political corruption"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Democracy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and non-elected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, so"]