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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA996248171003316"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"O'Connell Robert J"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"William James on the courage to believe / Robert J. O'Connell"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Fordham University Press, 2019"]
[{"$nulls":4},"New York : , : Fordham University Press, , 1997"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©1997"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"0-8232-8496-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-8232-8281-3"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-585-17134-3"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[2nd ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (x, 223 p. )"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"American philosophy series ; ; number 8"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"121/.6"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Belief and doubt"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Philosophy"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","William James' celebrated lecture on 'The Will to Believe' has kindled spirited controversy since the day it was delivered. In this lively reappraisal of that controversy, the author contributes some fresh contentions: that James' argument should be viewed against his indebtedness to Blaise Pascal and Charles Bernard Renouvier; that it works primarily to validate our 'over-beliefs'; and most surprising perhaps, that James envisages our 'passional nature' as intervening, not after, but before and throughout, our intellectual weighing of the evidence for belief."]