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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNIORUON00519862"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"KLEIN, Claude"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"La Repubblica di Weimar / Claude Klein"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Milano, : Mursia, [1970]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"150 p. ; 17 cm"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"943.085"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"WEIMAR - Germania - Storia"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Italiano"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910972000003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Niemeck Maik"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"First-Person Thought : Action, Identification and Experience / Maik Niemeck"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Paderborn, : Brill | mentis, 2022"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"3-96975-264-7"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (242 pages)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"153"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Selbstbewusstsein"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Bewusstsein"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"De Se Skeptizismus"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Indexikalische Gedanken"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Selbstsorge"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Emotionen"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Selbst-Repräsentationalismus"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Self-Consciousness"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Consciousness"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Immunity to Error through Misidentification"]
[{"$nulls":4},"De Se Skepticism"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Indexical Thought"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Self-Concern"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Emotions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Self-Representationalism"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Includes index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Intro -- Content -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought? -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them -- 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM) -- 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Thesis -- 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model -- 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action -- 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought -- 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech -- 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum? -- Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots -- 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern? -- 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component -- 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern -- 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself? -- 2.7 Some Empirical Support -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Getting IEM right -- 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification -- 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification -- 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types? -- 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens? -- 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens -- 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition? -- 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence -- 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession -- 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification."]
[{"$nulls":4},"3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility -- 3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM? -- 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought -- 3.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification -- 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw? -- 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument -- 4.4.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs? -- 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries? -- 4.5.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem -- 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception -- Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections -- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness -- 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Self-Representationalism -- 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism -- 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character -- 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content? -- 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves? -- 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between? -- 6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism -- 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience."]
[{"$nulls":4},"6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing -- 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode -- 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations -- 6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account -- 6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections -- Chapter 7. Conclusions -- Literature -- Index."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding \"yes.\" This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism."]