{"text_format":"2","workbook":"xls","n_sheets":1,"sheets":["report2"],"not_rendered":{"charts":0,"images":0,"macros":0,"external_links":1,"defined_names":1,"comments":0,"pivot_tables":0},"unopened":[],"bounds":{"document_bytes":16777216,"sheet_cells":100000,"run_cost":"one","rows_first":2000,"rows_last":500,"rows_between":2000,"halvings":0,"cell_chars":16384,"cell_head_chars":4096},"cells_cut":0,"cells_raw":0,"read":"whole","date_system":"1900","formulas":"cached_only"}

{"sheet":"report2","index":0,"n_rows":55,"n_cols":5,"rows_kept":55,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,2,0,3],[0,4,0,5],[1,2,1,3],[1,4,1,5],[2,2,2,3],[2,4,2,5],[3,2,3,3],[4,2,4,3],[13,2,13,3],[14,2,14,3],[15,2,15,3],[16,2,16,3],[48,2,48,3],[49,2,49,3],[53,2,53,3]],"flags":["formulas_cached_only"]}
[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910975153603321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Messmacher Miguel"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Sovereign Insurance and Program Design : : What is Optimal for the Sovereign? / / Miguel Messmacher"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786613828033"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781462312481"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1462312489"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781452786476"]
[{"$nulls":4},"145278647X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781283515580"]
[{"$nulls":4},"128351558X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781451908602"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1451908601"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (30 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Insurance - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Moral hazard - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International finance - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Actuarial Studies"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Consumption"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Instruments"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial risk management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Industries: Financial Services"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Institutional Investors"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Insurance & actuarial studies"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Insurance Companies"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Insurance companies"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Insurance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Economic Order and Integration"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Lending and Debt Problems"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Policy Coordination and Transmission"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics: Consumption"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Moral hazard"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Non-bank Financial Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Pension Funds"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Saving"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax incentives"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Wealth"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"March 2006.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"\"\"Contents\"\"; \"\"I. INTRODUCTION\"\"; \"\"II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE\"\"; \"\"III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE\"\"; \"\"IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER\"\"; \"\"V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY\"\"; \"\"VI. CONCLUSIONS\"\"; \"\"VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS\"\"; \"\"REFERENCES\"\""]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default."]