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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910132022203321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Popper Karl Raimund, Sir <1902-1994.>"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Come io vedo la filosofia e altri saggi / / Karl R. Popper ; introduzione di Massimo Baldini"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Roma, : Armando, 2005"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9788866777069"]
[{"$nulls":4},"8866777064"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"128 p"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Popperiana"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"140"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Italiano"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Collected writings, in Italian transl."]
[{"$nulls":4},"Author's name on t.p.: Karl R. Popper."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910975149703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Ivanova Anna"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Outcomes-Based Conditionality : : Its Role and Optimal Design / / Anna Ivanova"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786613826251"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781462380077"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1462380077"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781452771335"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1452771332"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781283513807"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1283513803"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781451984231"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1451984235"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (25 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Conditionality (International relations)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Asymmetric and Private Information"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Depository Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Industries: Financial Services"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Interest rates"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Loans"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Market interest rates"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Micro Finance Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Mortgages"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax incentives"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"May 2006.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"\"\"Contents\"\"; \"\"I. INTRODUCTION\"\"; \"\"II. THE MODEL\"\"; \"\"III. OBSERVABLE CASE\"\"; \"\"IV. UNOBSERVABLE CASE\"\"; \"\"V. CONCLUSIONS\"\"; \"\"REFERENCES\"\""]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized."]