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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910971215303321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Detragiache Enrica"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Responding to Banking Crises : : Lessons From Cross-Country Evidence / / Enrica Detragiache, Giang Ho"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2010"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786612845277"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781462300259"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1462300251"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781451962239"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1451962231"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781282845275"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1282845276"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781452708683"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1452708681"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"31 p"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"338.29125"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Financial crises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking crises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Central Banks and Their Policies"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crisis Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crisis management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crisis resolution"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Depository Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic & financial crises & disasters"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Crises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Risk Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Micro Finance Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Mortgages"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Argentina"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Methodology and Data -- A. Empirical Model -- B. Policy Response Index -- C. Control Variables -- D. The Instrument -- III. The Results -- A. Results from Baseline Specification -- B. Comparison with Other Results in the Literature -- C. Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Controls -- D. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Crisis Performance -- E. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Policy Response Indexes -- F. Fiscal Policy during the Crisis. -- IV. Conclusions -- References -- Text Tables -- 1. Correlation among Crisis Performance Measures -- 2. Construction of the Policy Index -- 3. Crisis Episodes, Policy Response, and Political System -- 4. Cross-Correlations between Political System and Crisis Policies -- 5. Baseline Results -- 6. Additional Control Variables -- 7. Alternative Measures of Crisis Performance -- 8. Alternative Policy Indexes -- 9. Fiscal Policy Response and Political System -- Figure 1. Distribution of Policy Index -- Appendix Tables -- A1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources -- A2. Summary Statistics -- A3. Cross Correlations among Variables."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","A common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias."]