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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910970193003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Monroe Hunter"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Can Markets Compute Equilibria? / / Hunter Monroe"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786612842467"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781462335602"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1462335608"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781452797502"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1452797501"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781451871715"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1451871716"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781282842465"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1282842463"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (22 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"511.3;511.352"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Computational complexity"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic data processing"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Asset prices"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Deflation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Inflation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Noncooperative Games"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Price Level"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Prices"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; I. Introduction; II. Is Computing Equilibria Difficult?; Table; 1. Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma; Figures; 1. NP-complete: Is there a Hamilton Cycle?; 2. P: Is this a Hamilton Cycle?; III. Are There Natural Problems with No Best Algorithm?; A. Superlinear vs. Blum Speedup; B. No Best Algorithm for Integer and Matrix Multiplication?; 3. Boolean circuit: Are at least two inputs \"TRUE\"?; C. The Power of Cancellation; D. No Best Algorithm for coNP-Complete Problems?; E. No Best Algorithm Versus No Algorithm at All; IV. Conclusion; 4. Is "]
[{"$nulls":4},"speedup inherited?; References"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Recent turmoil in financial and commodities markets has renewed questions regarding how well markets discover equilibrium prices, particularly when those markets are highly complex. A relatively new critique questions whether markets can realistically find equilibrium prices if computers cannot. For instance, in a simple exchange economy with Leontief preferences, the time required to compute equilibrium prices using the fastest known techniques is an exponential function of the number of goods. Furthermore, no efficient technique for this problem exists if a famous mathematical conjecture is correct. The conjecture states loosely that there are some problems for which finding an answer (i.e., an equilibrium price vector) is hard even though it is easy to check an answer (i.e., that a given price vector is an equilibrium). This paper provides a brief overview of computational complexity accessible to economists, and points out that the existence of computational problems with no best solution algorithm is relevant to this conjecture."]