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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910965128303321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Byman Daniel <1967->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Confronting Iraq : U.S. policy and the use of force since the Gulf War / / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2000"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"0-8330-3253-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-585-38352-9"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"xxiii, 101 p"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"327.730567"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"United States Foreign relations Iraq"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Iraq Foreign relations United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States Foreign relations 1989-"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States Military policy"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"MR-1146-OSD.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-101)."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"PREFACE -- FIGURES -- SUMMARY -- AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK -- IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY -- THE HISTORICAL RECORD -- IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMOVES -- IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- INTRODUCTION -- UNDERSTANDING COERCION -- DEFINING COERCION -- DIFFICULTIES IN DISTINGUISHING COMPELLENCE FROM DETERRENCE -- COERCION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS -- THE UNCERTAIN MEANING OF \"SUCCESS\" -- IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY -- HOW SADDAM STAYS IN POWER -- Security and Regime Protection Forces -- Political Techniques -- IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS -- SADDAM'S SHIFTING STRATEGY -- Saddam as an Adversary: A Cagey Foe or Foolish Thug? -- U.S. OBJECTIVES, OPTIONS, ASSUMPTIONS -- ANALYTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- CONTAINING IRAQI AGGRESSION -- PREVENTING NBC BUILDUP -- TOPPLING SADDAM'S REGIME -- PRESERVING REGIONAL STABILITY -- CONSTRAINTS ON THE UNITED STATES -- Fear of Iraqi Fragmentation -- Discomfort with Sanctions -- Preserving an International Alliance -- Humanitarian Ambivalence -- Domestic Limits to Any Concessions -- ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: THE HISTORICAL RECORD -- ESTABLISHING UNSCOM INSPECTIONS (1991) -- CREATING A KURDISH SAFE HAVEN (1991-1992) -- ESTABLISHING A SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONE (AUGUST 1992- PRESENT) -- RESPONDING TO INSPECTION AND NO-FLY ZONE STANDOFFS (DECEMBER 1992- "]
[{"$nulls":4},"JANUARY 1993) -- DETERRING AN INVASION OF KUWAIT (1994) -- PUNISHING THE IRAQI THRUST INTO NORTHERN IRAQ (1996) -- HALTING DEFIANCE OF UNSCOM (1997-1998) -- FORCING COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCOM (OPERATION DESERT FOX, DECEMBER 1998) -- THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CONFRONTATION -- ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: A SCORECARD -- U.S. POLICY TRADEOFFS AND GULF SECURITY -- IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES: AN ASSESSMENT -- IRAQI PRESSURE POINTS -- WHAT IRAQ IS NOT SENSITIVE TO -- IRAQI COUNTERMOVES TO OFFSET VULNERABILITIES -- IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION -- RECOGNIZING ADVERSARY CENTERS OF GRAVITY."]
[{"$nulls":4},"COERCION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS -- UNDERSTANDING WHAT CANNOT BE AFFECTED -- INTEGRATING COERCIVE THREATS INTO LONG-TERM POLICY -- RECOGNIZING OUR OWN LIMITS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States, Baghdad has repeatedly compromised, and at times caved, in response to U.S. pressure and threats. An analysis of attempts to coerce Iraq since Desert Storm reveals that military strikes and other forms of pressure that threatened Saddam Husayn's relationship with his power base proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime. When coercing Saddam or other foes, U.S. policymakers should design a strategy around the adversary's center of gravity while seeking to neutralize adversary efforts to counter-coerce the United States and appreciating the policy constraints imposed by domestic politics and international alliances."]