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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910964647903321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Prinz Jesse J"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"The emotional construction of morals / / Jesse J. Prinz"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2007"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-281-14556-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786611145569"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-153614-8"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (347 p.)"]
[null,null,"Classificazione",null,"08.38"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"171/.2"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Ethics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Emotions"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. [309]-328) and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Morality and emotion -- Constructing morals."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Jesse Prinz presents a bravura argument for highly controversial claims about morality, which go to the heart of our understanding of ourselves. He argues that moral values are based on emotional responses, and that these are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. These two claims support a form of moral relativism. - ;Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not h"]