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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910962899003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Gaertner Wulf"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"A primer in social choice theory / / Wulf Gaertner"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, c2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786612268823"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780191569876"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0191569879"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781282268821"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1282268821"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780191609893"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0191609897"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780199565306"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0199565309"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[Rev. ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"xi, 218 p. : ill"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"LSE perspectives in economic analysis"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"302/.1301"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Social choice"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Previous ed. published in 2006."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and indexes."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Cover -- A Primer in Social Choice Theory: Revised Edition -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Preface to the Revised Edition -- Preface and Acknowledgements to the First Edition -- Contents -- About the Author -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Basic questions -- 1.2. Catching a glimpse of the past -- 1.3. Basic formalism -- 1.4. Aggregation of preferences - how can this be done? -- 1.5. The informational aspect -- 1.6. A path through haze, or how to read this book -- 1.7. Some exercises -- 2: Arrow's impossibility result -- 2.1. The axiom system and the theorem -- 2.2. The original proof -- 2.3. A second proof -- 2.4. A third diagrammatic proof -- 2.5. A short summary -- 2.6. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCE -- MORE ADVANCED -- 3: Majority decision under restricted domains -- 3.1. The simple majority rule -- 3.2. Single-peaked preferences -- 3.3. Other domain conditions: qualitative and quantitative -- 3.4. A short summary -- 3.5. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 4: Individual rights -- 4.1. Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal -- 4.2. Gibbard's theory of alienable rights -- 4.3. Conditional and unconditional preferences -- "]
[{"$nulls":4},"4.4. Conditional and unconditional preferences again: matching pennies and the prisoners' dilemma -- 4.5. The game form approach to rights -- 4.6. A short summary -- 4.7. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 5: Manipulability -- 5.1. The underlying problem -- 5.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- 5.3. Strategy-proofness and restricted domains -- 5.4. A short summary -- 5.5. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 6: Escaping impossibilities: social choice rules -- 6.1. The Pareto-extension rule and veto power -- 6.2. Scoring functions and the Borda rule."]
[{"$nulls":4},"6.3. Other social choice rules -- 6.4. A parliamentary vote: Berlin vs. Bonn -- 6.5. A short summary -- 6.6. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCE -- MORE ADVANCED -- 7: Distributive justice: Rawlsian and utilitarian rules -- 7.1. The philosophical background -- 7.2. The informational structure -- 7.3. Axioms and characterizations -- 7.4. Diagrammatic proofs again -- 7.5. Harsanyi's utilitarianism -- 7.6. A short summary -- 7.7. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 8: Cooperative bargaining -- 8.1. The bargaining problem -- 8.2. Nash's bargaining solution -- 8.3. Zeuthen's principle of alternating concessions -- 8.4. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution -- 8.5. A philosopher's view -- 8.6. Kalai's egalitarian solution -- 8.7. A short summary -- 8.8. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 9: Empirical social choice -- 9.1. Theory and opinions of the general public -- 9.2. Needs vs. tastes - the approach by Yaari and Bar-Hillel -- 9.3. Rawls's equity axiom - how does it fare? -- 9.4. From here to where? -- 9.5. A short summary -- 9.6. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCE -- 10: A few steps beyond -- 10.1. Social choice rules in continuous space -- 10.2. The uniform rule -- 10.3. Freedom of choice -- 10.4. An epilogue instead of a summary -- References -- Hints to the Exercises -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Chapter 9 -- Author Index -- Subject Index."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This introductory text explores the theory of social choice. This text is an important starting point for students grappling with the complexities of social choice theory. Rigorous yet accessible, with new chapter exercises, it avoids the use of technical language and provides an up-to-date discussion of this rapidly developing field."]