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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910957395003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Annen Kurt"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9781475520217"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1475520212"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781475539240"]
[{"$nulls":4},"147553924X"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (38 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"337"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Economic assistance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Flow of funds"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budget planning and preparation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budget Systems"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budget"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budgeting & financial management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budgeting"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Competition"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Exports and Imports"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial markets"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Foreign Aid"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Foreign aid"]
[{"$nulls":4},"General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Government Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Fiscal Issues"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Public Goods"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International relief"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National Budget"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Poverty & precarity"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Poverty and Homelessness"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Poverty reduction"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Poverty"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Provision and Effects of Welfare Program"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public financial management (PFM)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Social Services and Welfare"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Social welfare & social services"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"China, People's Republic of"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size"]
[{"$nulls":4},"2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors  budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation."]