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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910955171803321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Gonçalves Fernando M"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Accumulating Foreign Reserves Under Floating Exchange Rates / / Fernando M. Gonçalves"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786612840517"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781462366903"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1462366902"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781452702674"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1452702675"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781451869576"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1451869576"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781282840515"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1282840517"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (43 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[{"$nulls":4},"IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/96"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"332.456"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Foreign exchange rates - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Bank reserves - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Monetary policy - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Currency"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Deflation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Foreign exchange intervention"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Foreign exchange reserves"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Foreign Exchange"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Foreign exchange"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Inflation targeting"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Inflation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Institutional arrangements for revenue administration"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Monetary economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Monetary Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Monetary policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Money and Monetary Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Price Level"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Prices"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Reserves accumulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Revenue"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; 1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical Model: Basic Set-up; 3. Complete Information; 3.1. Centralization; 3.2. Institutional Arrangements in Practice; 3.3. Separation; 3.4. Centralization versus Separation; 4. Incomplete Information; 4.1. Stage 1: Centralization versus Separation; Figures; 1. Timetable; 4.2. Stage 0: Centralization versus Separation; 5. Comparative Analysis Under Incomplete Information; 5.1. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 2. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 5.2. The Trade-off Between Reserve Accumulation and Credibility Building; 5.3. Centralization versus Separation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"5.3.1. Macroeconomic Stability3. Macroeconomic Stability - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.2. Reserve Targeting; 4. Reserve Targeting - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.3. Discussion; 6. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 1; Proof of Corollary 1"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Official accumulation of foreign reserves may be perceived as interventions to influence the exchange rate, undermining the credibility of floating exchange rates and inflation targets. This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between reserve accumulation and monetary policy. The model uncovers a trade-off between the speed of reserve accumulation and anti-inflationary credibility. Under reasonable assumptions, delegation of intervention and monetary policy decisions to separate government agencies allows faster reserve accumulation, while centralization of these decisions results in a more stable economy. The analysis underscores the importance of rather overlooked institutional features of policymaking in open economies."]