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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910953791803321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Andrews Matt <1972->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"The limits of institutional reform in development : changing rules for realistic solutions / / Matt Andrews, Harvard Kennedy School of Government"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2013"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-139-61034-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-107-23514-6"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-139-60875-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-139-61220-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-139-62522-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-139-61592-0"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-139-06097-X"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xii, 254 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)"]
[null,null,"Classificazione",null,"BUS068000"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"338.9009172/4"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Institution building - Developing countries"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic development - Developing countries"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Developing countries Economic conditions"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"1. Change rules, change governments, and develop? -- 2. Deconstructing the puzzling evidence of reform -- 3. Overlooking the change context -- 4. Reforms as overspecified and oversimplified solutions -- 5. Limited engagement, limited change -- 6. Expecting reform limits in development -- 7. Problem-driven learning sparks institutional change -- 8. Finding and fitting solutions that work -- 9. Broad engagement, broader (and deeper) change -- 10. Reforming rules of the development game itself."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from "]
[{"$nulls":4},"institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents."]