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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910953593303321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Holton Richard <1962->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Willing, wanting, waiting / / Richard Holton"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, c2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9786612268748"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780191568756"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0191568759"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781282268746"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1282268740"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780199214570"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0199214573"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780191706547"]
[{"$nulls":4},"019170654X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"xiii, 203 p. ; ; 22 cm"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"128/.3"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Will"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. [185]-197) and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Intention -- Belief -- Choice -- Weakness of will -- Temptation -- Strength of will -- Rationality -- Freedom."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Richard Holton presents an original account of intention, choice, weakness of will, strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. He argues that, rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, the central components of the will are there to compensate for our inability to make or maintain sound judgments."]