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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910822696403321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Alexander Carol (Economist)"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Corruption and fraud in financial markets : malpractice, misconduct and manipulation / / Carol Alexander, Douglas Cumming"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"England : , : Wiley, , [2020]"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2020"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-394-17814-X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (626 pages)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"364.168"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Commercial crimes"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- About the Editors -- List of Contributors -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Part I What are Manipulation and Fraud and why do They matter? -- Chapter 2: An Overview of Market Manipulation -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Definitions of Market Manipulation -- 2.2.1 Legal Interpretation and Provisions against Market Manipulation -- 2.2.2 Economics and Legal Studies Perspective -- 2.3 A Taxonomy of the Types of Market Manipulation -- 2.3.1 Categories of Market Manipulation -- 2.3.2 Market Manipulation Techniques -- 2.4 Research on Market Manipulation -- 2.4.1 Theoretical Literature -- 2.4.2 Empirical Literature -- 2.4.3 Conclusions from the Research on Market Manipulation -- 2.5 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: A Taxonomy of Financial Market Misconduct -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Challenges in Research on Financial Market Misconduct -- 3.3 Defining Financial Market Misconduct -- 3.3.1 Price Manipulation -- 3.3.2 Circular Trading -- 3.3.3 Collusion and Information Sharing -- 3.3.4 Inside Information -- 3.3.5 Reference Price Influence -- 3.3.6 Improper Order Handling -- 3.3.7 Misleading Customers -- 3.4 Defining Financial Fraud -- 3.4.1 Credit Card Fraud -- 3.4.2 Money Laundering -- 3.4.3 Financial Statement Fraud -- 3.4.4 Computer Intrusion Fraud -- 3.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Financial Misconduct and Market-Based Penalties -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Notable Cases of Financial Reporting Fraud -- 4.3 Financial Reporting Misconduct and Legal Redress -- 4.4 Evolution of US Financial Regulations -- 4.4.1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (1995) -- 4.4.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) -- 4.4.3 Dodd-Frank Act "]
[{"$nulls":4},"(2010) -- 4.5 Legal versus Market-Based Penalties for Financial Misconduct -- 4.5.1 Common Forms of Legal Penalties."]
[{"$nulls":4},"4.5.2 Role of Market-Based Penalties -- 4.6 Firm-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct -- 4.6.1 Direct Economic Costs Captured in Loss of Market Value -- 4.6.2 Loss of Firm Reputation -- 4.6.3 Spillover of Reputational Effect -- 4.6.4 Governance Risk and Insurance Premiums -- 4.6.5 Reduced Liquidity -- 4.6.6 Access to Financing -- 4.6.7 Reduced Innovation -- 4.6.8 Mergers and Acquisitions -- 4.7 Individual-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct -- 4.7.1 Executive and Director Turnover -- 4.7.2 Impaired Career Progression -- 4.7.3 Loss of Reputation -- 4.7.4 Executive Compensation -- 4.7.5 Strengthened Monitoring -- 4.8 Causes, Risks, and Moderators of Financial Misconduct -- 4.8.1 Fraud Incentives -- 4.8.2 Risk Factors -- 4.8.3 Public Enforcement: Regulatory and Judicial Stringency -- 4.8.4 Public Enforcement: Detection and Surveillance -- 4.8.5 Private Enforcement -- 4.9 Other Non-Financial Misconduct -- 4.10 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 5: Insider Trading and Market Manipulation -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Regulatory Framework on Insider Trading and Market Manipulation -- 5.3 Recent Examples of Market Manipulation and Insider Trading -- 5.4 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 6: Financial Fraud and Reputational Capital -- 6.1 Financial Frauds in the 2000s -- 6.2 The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Firm Value and Reputational Capital -- 6.2.1 Market Value Losses When Financial Misconduct Is Revealed -- 6.2.2 Spillover Effects -- 6.2.3 Reputational Losses for Financial Misconduct -- 6.2.4 Direct Measures of Lost Reputational Capital -- 6.2.5 Do Misconduct Firms Always Lose Reputational Capital? -- 6.2.6 Rebuilding Reputational Capital -- 6.3 The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Shareholders and Managers -- 6.3.1 Should Shareholders Pay? Do Managers Pay? -- 6.3.2 Do Shareholders Pay Twice?."]
[{"$nulls":4},"6.3.3 Are Firm-Level Penalties Efficient? -- 6.3.4 Consequences for Managers and Directors -- 6.4 Why Do Managers Do It? Motives and Constraints -- 6.4.1 Motives for Financial Misconduct -- 6.4.2 Constraints on Financial Misconduct -- 6.5 Proxies and Databases Used to Identify Samples of Financial Statement Misconduct -- 6.6 Conclusion: Reputation, Enforcement, and Culture -- References -- Part II How and Where Does Misconduct Occur? -- Chapter 7: Manipulative and Collusive Practices in FX Markets -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Different Types of FX Orders -- 7.3 The Unique FX Market Structure -- 7.4 Examples of Manipulative and Collusive Practices in FX Markets -- 7.4.1 Front Running -- 7.4.2 Triggering Stop-Loss Orders -- 7.4.3 'Banging the Close' -- 7.4.4 Collusion and Sharing of Confidential Information -- 7.4.5 Spoofing -- 7.4.6 Market Abuse via Electronic Trading Platforms -- 7.5 The Reform Process -- References -- Chapter 8: Fraud and Manipulation within Cryptocurrency Markets -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Why Do fraud and Manipulation Occur in Cryptocurrency Markets? -- 8.2.1 Lack of Consistent Regulation -- 8.2.2 Relative Anonymity -- 8.2.3 Low Barriers to Entry -- 8.2.4 Exchange Standards and Sophistication -- 8.3 Pump and Dumps -- 8.3.1 Case Studies -- 8.4 Inflated Trading Volume -- 8.4.1 Case Study: January 2017 and PBoC Involvement -- 8.5 Exchange DDoS Attacks -- 8.5.1 Case Study -- 8.6 Hacks and Exploitations -- 8.6.1 Exchange Hacks -- 8.6.2 Smart Contract Exploits -- 8.6.3 Protocol Exploitation -- 8.7 Flash Crashes -- 8.7.1 GDAX-ETH/USD Flash Crash -- 8.8 Order Book-Based Manipulations -- 8.8.1 Quote Stuffing -- 8.8.2 Order Spoofing -- 8.9 Stablecoins and Tether -- 8.9.1 Tether Historical Timeline -- 8.9.2 Tether Controversy and Criticism -- 8.9.3 Tether's Significance in Cryptocurrency Global Markets -- 8.10 Summary and "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Conclusions."]
[{"$nulls":4},"References -- Chapter 9: The Integrity of Closing Prices -- 9.1 Why Closing Prices Matter -- 9.2 Painting the Tape and Portfolio Pumping -- 9.3 'Bang-the-Close' Manipulation: The Response of Financial Intermediaries -- 9.4 Stock Price Pinning on Option Expiration Dates -- 9.5 Conclusion: Lessons for the Regulation and Design of Financial Markets -- References -- Chapter 10: A Trader's Perspective on Market Abuse Regulations -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Getting the Trading Edge -- 10.3 A Typical Trader's Market Window -- 10.4 Wash Trades -- 10.5 High Ticking/Low Ticking - Momentum Ignition -- 10.6 Spoofing -- 10.7 Layering -- 10.8 Smoking -- 10.9 Case Study: Paul Rotter a.k.a. 'The Flipper' -- 10.10 The Innocent and the Guilty -- 10.11 What Are Exchanges Doing to Prevent Market Abuse? -- 10.11.1 CME Group -- 10.11.2 ICE -- 10.12 What Are Trading Companies Doing to Prevent Abuse? -- 10.13 Will There Be an End to Market Abuse? -- Part III Who are These Scoundrels? -- Chapter 11: Misconduct in Banking: Governance and the Board of Directors -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Literature Review -- 11.3 Research Design -- 11.3.1 Data -- 11.3.2 Empirical Design -- 11.3.3 Variables -- 11.4 Empirical Results -- 11.4.1 Main Results -- 11.4.2 Results for Different Classes of Enforcement Actions -- 11.4.3 Does Better Board Quality Alleviate Shareholder Wealth Losses? -- 11.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 12: Misconduct and Fraud by Investment Managers -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Related Research -- 12.3 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Mandatory Disclosures -- 12.4 Data -- 12.4.1 Investment Fraud -- 12.4.2 Form ADV Data and Variables -- 12.5 Predicting Fraud and Misconduct -- 12.5.1 Predicting Fraud by Investment Managers -- 12.5.2 Interpreting the Predictive Content of the Models -- 12.5.3 K-Fold Cross-Validation Tests."]
[{"$nulls":4},"12.6 Predicting the Initiation vs. the Continuance of Fraud -- 12.7 Firm-Wide Fraud vs. Fraud by a Rogue Employee -- 12.8 Out-of-Sample Prediction and Model Stability -- 12.9 Policy Implications and Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 13: Options Backdating and Shareholders -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Stock Return Patterns around Option Grants -- 13.3 The Backdating Practice -- 13.4 Media Coverage, Restatement, and Investigation -- 13.5 Stock Market Reaction to Public Revelations of Backdating -- 13.6 Investor Reaction to (and Anticipation of) Public Revelations -- 13.7 Other Types of Misbehaviour Related to Option Grants -- 13.7.1 Forward Dating -- 13.7.2 Selective Disclosure -- 13.7.3 Option Exercise Backdating -- 13.7.4 Independent Director Backdating -- 13.8 Connections with Questionable Practices by Corporate Executives and Other Agents -- 13.9 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 14: The Strategic Behaviour of Underwriters in Valuing IPOs -- 14.1 Valuing IPOs -- 14.2 The Underwriter's Incentives in the Valuation of IPOs -- 14.3 Literature Review -- 14.4 Sample, Data, and Methodology -- 14.4.1 Sample and Data -- 14.4.2 Alternative Selection Criteria of Comparable Firms -- 14.4.3 Valuation Bias and IPO Premium -- 14.5 Results -- 14.5.1 Algorithmic Selections -- 14.5.2 Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts -- 14.5.3 Underwriters' Selection of Comparable Firms Pre- vs. Post-IPO -- 14.5.4 Pre- vs. Post-IPO Selections and Industry Effects -- 14.6 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 15: Governance of Financial Services Outsourcing: Managing Misconduct and Third-Party Risks -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 The Four Components in Outsourcing -- 15.2.1 Efficient Outsourcing -- 15.2.2 The Four-Factor Governance Model -- 15.2.3 Misconduct in Outsourcing and the Ability of Financial Institutions to Monitor."]
[{"$nulls":4},"15.3 The Interaction between Contracting and Monitoring."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","\"Apart from headline cases like the LIBOR scandal, financial market misconduct is actually prevalent in a surprisingly large number of firms. According to a study published in 2014, financial market misconduct and fraud affects about 15% of publicly listed companies each year; and a study published in 2008 claimed that it can cost between 20% and 38% of the company's value\"--"]