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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910820577503321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Nichols Shaun"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / / Shaun Nichols"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Oxford : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"0-19-104009-6"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-880131-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-179547-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-104008-8"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[First edition.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (199 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"123.5"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Responsibility"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Ethics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Free will and determinism"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Shaun Nichols offers a naturalistic, psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. He argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and therefore unjustified, goes on to suggest that there is no single answer to whether free will exists, and promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues."]