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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910816308803321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Keudel Oleksandra"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"How patronal networks shape opportunities for local citizen participation in a hybrid regime : a comparative analysis of five cities in Ukraine / / Oleksandra Keudel ; with a foreword by Sabine Kropp"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Stuttgart : , : ibidem-Verlag, , [2022]"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2022"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"3-8382-7671-X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource  (528 pages) : illustrations"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society ; ; v.245"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"320.8"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Municipal government - Ukraine - Citizen participation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Patronage, Political - Ukraine"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Appendices -- List of Abbreviations -- Foreword by Sabine Kropp -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Problem definition and research question -- 1.1.1 Why should we care about formal institutional mechanisms for citizen participation? -- 1.1.2 Ukraine's hybrid regime as an ambiguous case for local citizen participation -- 1.1.3 Why is the variation in institutional mechanisms for citizen participation in Ukraine puzzling? -- 1.1.4 The research question -- 1.2 Central argument: Institutions for citizen participation as a by-product of local patronal politics -- 1.3 Methodological approach -- 1.4 Contribution -- 1.5 Structure of the book -- 2 Citizen Participation Concept and Its Operationalization for the Cases in Ukraine -- 2.1 Conceptualizing citizen participation -- 2.1.1 Theoretical approaches to citizen participation: Between democracy enhancement and government efficiency -- 2.1.2 Definition of citizen participation as a multi-dimensional process -- 2.2 Operationalizing citizen participation through formal institutional mechanisms -- 2.2.1 Institutional mechanisms for citizen participation in Ukraine -- 2.2.2 Measurement of variation in institutional mechanisms for citizen participation -- 2.3 Conclusion -- 3 A Framework for Explaining Variation in Opportunities for Local Citizen Participation -- 3.1 Unpacking the context for citizen participation: Hybrid political regime -- 3.1.1 Alternative conceptualizations of regime hybridity -- 3.1.2 Hybrid regime as the "]
[{"$nulls":4},"outcome of elite interactions that limit access to societal resources and functions -- 3.2 Conceptualizing patronal networks and their arrangements -- 3.2.1 Arrangements of patronal networks: The typology -- 3.2.2 Cohesion in patronal networks -- 3.2.3 Delineating patronal networks from corrupt networks."]
[{"$nulls":4},"3.3 Explaining opportunities for citizen participation: Patronal networks and resource preferences of incumbents -- 3.3.1 Uncertainty in patronal network arrangements and the institutional preferences of local politicians -- 3.3.2 Explicating the causal mechanism: the functional fit of citizen participation to incumbents' governance resources -- 3.4 Summary: How incumbent cherry-picking in varying arrangements of patronal networks translates into diverse opportunities for citizen participation -- 4 Research Context and Design -- 4.1 Context of the study -- 4.1.1 Ukrainian patronal politics and its sub-national dimension -- 4.1.2 Institutional enablers for patronal politics at the local level -- 4.2 Empirical strategy and main methodological considerations -- 4.2.1 Comparative case study in five purposefully selected cities -- 4.2.2 Data collection: semi-structured interviews, open data sources and (local) media -- 4.2.3 Content analysis for interview data -- 4.3 Case selection -- 4.3.1 Regional centres as potential cases -- 4.3.2 Measurement of variation in arrangements of patronal networks -- 4.3.3 Mapping potential cases -- 4.3.4 Selecting cases -- 4.4 Operationalization of the independent variable for the case studies -- 4.4.1 Identifying patronal networks in the case studies -- 4.4.2 Identifying arrangements of patronal networks in the case studies -- 4.5 Operationalization of the dependent variable for the case studies -- 4.5.1 Chernivtsi -- 4.5.2 Lviv -- 4.5.3 Kropyvnytskyi -- 4.5.4 Odesa -- 4.5.5 Kharkiv -- 4.6 Summary and outlook for the empirical chapters -- 5 Kharkiv A Single-Pyramid Arrangement Restricts Opportunities for Citizen Participation -- 5.1 The arrangement of patronal networks -- 5.1.1 The patronal network landscape -- 5.1.2 A single-pyramid arrangement at the city level: Patronage via the executive."]
[{"$nulls":4},"5.2 Adoption of participatory mechanisms -- 5.2.1 Struggles for citizen informing via the Rules of Procedure of the city council and the executive committee -- 5.2.2 Continuing limits to consulting, control and partnership mechanisms in the city charter -- 5.2.3 The participatory budget: The only supported participatory mechanism -- 5.3 A single-pyramid arrangement amplifies the role of mayors' personal preferences for participation -- 5.4 The selective functional fit and (non-)adoption of participatory mechanisms -- 5.4.1 Prioritizing the partnership dimension as supplementing organization and authority: The advantages of PB for the patron -- 5.4.2 Restricted consulting and (nearly) impossible control provide a good fit to the mayor's prioritised resource of authority -- 5.4.3 Misfit of the informing dimension to the mayor's governance resources -- 5.5 Conclusion -- 6 Odesa Coordination under a Dominant Network Hampers Participatory Institutions -- 6.1 Arrangement of patronal networks -- 6.1.1 The patronal network landscape -- 6.1.2 Coordinated network arrangement, facilitated by the mayor -- 6.2 Adoption of participatory mechanisms -- 6.2.1 Fragmented gains for citizen informing: The Rules of Procedure of the city council and of the executive committee -- 6.2.2 Control and consulting dimensions: Tolerated electronic petitions and the \"good-as-is\" city charter -- 6.2.3 Partnership dimension: The participatory budget as a flagship participatory project -- 6.3 A coordinated arrangement of patronal networks limits options for citizen participation -- 6.3.1 Selective adoption of mechanisms within informing dimension-the right target "]
[{"$nulls":4},"and time -- 6.3.2 Consulting, partnership, and control mechanisms selectively avoided because they infringe on the nodality and authority of the executive."]
[{"$nulls":4},"6.4 Functional fit: Enables selective introduction of mechanisms within consulting and partnership dimensions, and disables most others -- 6.4.1 Electronic petitions: The mayor's consulting mechanism -- 6.4.2 Functional fit of the participatory budget to the mayor's preferred resources -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 7 Lviv The Coordination of \"Equals\" Returns Accessible Participatory Institutions -- 7.1 Arrangement of patronal networks -- 7.1.1 The patronal network landscape -- 7.1.2 Coordinated arrangement of local patronal networks under the mayor 's brokerage and occasional challenger attempts -- 7.2 Adoption of participatory mechanisms -- 7.2.1 Informing dimension: The Rules of Procedure of the city council and the executive committee -- 7.2.2 Control and consulting dimensions: The city charter, its constituent regulations and electronic petitions -- 7.2.3 Partnership dimension: The participatory budget and local initiative -- 7.3 The framework-setting role of the arrangement of patronal networks -- 7.3.1 Coordination restricts the adoption of mechanisms of citizen informing -- 7.3.2 Steered participation: The consulting and control dimensions \"filtered\" through the executive -- 7.3.3 Partnership: A win-win solution under the supervision of the executive -- 7.4 The functional fit as an enabler for participatory institutions -- 7.4.1 Functional fit: Steered participation strengthens the mayor's brokering of resources -- 7.4.2 The informing dimension misaligns with the mayor's brokering resources -- 7.5 Conclusion -- 8 Kropyvnytskyi Competition-Turned-Selective-Coordination Slowed Down Participatory Developments -- 8.1 Arrangement of patronal networks: Competition turned into selective coordination -- 8.1.1 The patronal network landscape -- 8.1.2 Dynamic arrangement of local patronal networks: From competition to selective coordination."]
[{"$nulls":4},"8.2 Adoption of participatory mechanisms -- 8.2.1 Informing dimension: The Rules of Procedure of the city council -- 8.2.2 Control and consulting dimensions: The city charter, electronic petitions and consultations with public -- 8.2.3 The participatory budget -- 8.3 The framework-setting role of the arrangement of patronal networks -- 8.3.1 How competition was a \"window of opportunity\" for the informing dimension of participation -- 8.3.2 The increasing coordination between patronal networks stalled the adoption of mechanisms within the control dimension -- 8.3.3 The partnership dimension: the participatory budget-a priority in the coordination phase -- 8.4 The functional fit of citizen participation to resource preferences of local politicians -- 8.4.1 Politicians' governance resources and the functional fit of informing and control -- 8.4.2 Politicians' governance resources and the functional fit of partnership and consulting -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 9 Chernivtsi Competing Arrangement and the Mayor's Functional Fit Return Accessible Participatory Mechanisms -- 9.1 Arrangement of patronal networks -- 9.1.1 The patronal network landscape -- 9.1.2 Dynamic development of competition between major patronal networks -- 9.2 Adoption of participatory mechanisms -- 9.2.1 The city charter -- 9.2.2 The Rules of Procedure of the city council -- 9.2.3 The participatory budget -- 9.2.4 Electronic petitions -- 9.3 Competing arrangement of patronal networks is conducive to political support for citizen participation -- 9.3.1 How competition between patronal networks returned participatory institutions within the informing and control dimensions -- 9.3.2 The consulting dimension and its (mis)use for inter-network competition -- 9.4 The functional fit of citizen participation and \"the public\" as a resource; 9.4.1 Participatory budget "]
[{"$nulls":4},"as a tool to supplement governance resources for leaders of both competing networks."]