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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910789214903321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Saari Donald G"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Basic Geometry of Voting [[electronic resource] /] / by Donald G. Saari"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Berlin, Heidelberg : , : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"3-642-57748-2"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed. 1995.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (XII, 300 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"324/.01/516"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Operations research"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Decision making"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Operations Research/Decision Theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"With 102 Figures.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"I. From an Election Fable to Election Procedures -- 1.1 An Electoral Fable -- 1.2 The Moral of the Tale -- 1.3 From Aristotle to “Fast Eddie” -- 1.4 What Kind of Geometry? -- II. Geometry for Positional And Pairwise Voting -- 2.1 Ranking Regions -- 2.2 Profiles and Election Mappings -- III. The Problem With Condorcet -- 3.1 Why Can’t an Organization Be More Like a Person? -- 3.2 Geometry of Pairwise Voting -- 3.3 Black’s Single-Peakedness -- 3.4 Arrow’s Theorem -- IV. Positional Voting And the BC -- 4.1 Positional Voting Methods -- 4.2 What a Difference a Procedure Makes; Several Different Outcomes -- 4.3 Positional Versus Pairwise Voting -- 4.4 Profile Decomposition -- 4.5 From Aggregating Pairwise Votes to the Borda Count -- 4.6 The Other Positional Voting Methods -- 4.7 Multiple Voting Schemes -- 4.8 Other Election Procedures -- V. Other Voting Issues -- 5.1 Weak Consistency: The Sum of the Parts -- 5.2 From Involvement and Monotonicity to Manipulation -- 5.3 Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Manipulable Procedures -- 5.4 Proportional Representation -- 5.5 House Monotone Methods -- VI. Notes -- VII. References."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","A surprise is how the complexities of voting theory can be explained and resolved with the comfortable geometry of our three-dimensional world. This book is directed toward students and others wishing to learn about voting, experts will discover previously unpublished results. As an example, a new profile decomposition quickly resolves two "]
[{"$nulls":4},"centuries old controversies of Condorcet and Borda, demonstrates, that the rankings of pairwise and other methods differ because they rely on different information, casts series doubt on the reliability of a Condorcet winner as a standard for the field, makes the famous Arrow`s Theorem predictable, and simplifies the construction of examples. The geometry unifies seemingly disparate topics as manipulation, monotonicity, and even the apportionment issues of the US Supreme Court."]