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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788699203321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Vardy Felix"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : : A Model of Vote Buying / / Felix Vardy, John Morgan"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-1147-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-3804-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-283-51666-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786613829115"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4519-0807-5"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (23 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Corruption"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Competition"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Criminology"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Social Choice"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Clubs"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Committees"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Associations"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Bureaucracy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Administrative Processes in Public Organizations"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Corporate crime"]
[{"$nulls":4},"white-collar crime"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax incentives"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial markets"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crime"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United Kingdom"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"January 2006.\""]
[{"$nulls":4},"\"IMF Institute.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"\"\"Contents\"\"; \"\"I. Introduction\"\"; \"\"II. The Model\"\"; \"\"III. Variation in Contracts\"\"; \"\"A. Contracting on Votes\"\"; \"\"B. Contracting on Outcomes\"\"; \"\"C. Contracting on Votes and Vote Shares\"\"; \"\"IV. Related Literature\"\"; \"\"V. Conclusions\"\"; \"\"References\"\""]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares."]